Latticework 2025 began with Thomas A. Russo, Managing Member of Gardner Russo & Quinn, who called the current investment landscape “as weird as I can ever remember”. He painted a picture of a bifurcated market, where capital allocation seems divorced from traditional economic logic. He noted, for instance, that while Philip Morris (NYSE: PM) announced a $37 million capital project, the same day might see $350 billion allocated to AI-related spending, often financed through unconventional means like options rather than direct equity investment. This environment, fueled by vast sums of government money, creates a challenging backdrop that demands a disciplined, long-term approach rooted in the principles of Buffett and Munger: low turnover, a focus on the non-taxation of unrealized gains, and a search for businesses that possess both the “capacity to reinvest” and the “capacity to suffer”.
The Weetabix Case and the Power of Capital Allocation
To illustrate his core tenets, Tom presented a detailed case study of his firm’s investment in Weetabix, a UK-based cereal company they owned for 21 years. The company was a disciplined operator but had virtually no opportunities for internal reinvestment, as its consumer base was almost exclusively in England. Instead of pursuing value-destructive acquisitions, management simply allowed cash to build on the balance sheet. Over two decades, the investment compounded at 11.5% annually. However, Tom highlighted a crucial lesson: had the family-run company been comfortable using its accumulating cash to repurchase its own stock, the compound annual return would have been closer to 19%.
The “Capacity to Suffer”
Tom’s concept of the “capacity to suffer” is not about investors enduring poor returns, but about a management team’s willingness to absorb short-term earnings pressure to make crucial long-term strategic investments. The ability to do this is often a direct function of a company’s governance and ownership structure.
He provided a powerful negative example with General Mills (NYSE: GIS) and its Yoplait yogurt franchise. When a new competitor, Chobani, emerged, General Mills’ management identified the threat and knew that a $12 million investment could launch a competing product. However, they declined to make the investment because the expense would have jeopardized their ability to meet a near-term earnings pledge. By prioritizing the quarter over the decade, they ceded the market. Chobani (Nasdaq: CHO) went on to become a titan in the yogurt industry, and General Mills eventually sold the withered Yoplait brand at a fraction of its former value.
In stark contrast, Tom praised Alphabet (Nasdaq: GOOGL), which, from its IPO, instituted a dual-class share structure. This was explicitly designed to give its founders the freedom to pursue “moonshot” projects and absorb the associated losses without facing pressure from a short-term-oriented Wall Street. This governance structure institutionalized the capacity to suffer, enabling the long-term investments in areas like Android, cloud computing, and AI that drive the company’s value today.
Investment Ideas in a “Strange” Market
Spirits (a contrarian opportunity): Tom sees a classic contrarian setup in the global spirits industry. The sector faces headwinds, including a US Surgeon General’s warning about alcohol and a general consumer health trend. However, these negatives obscure long-term tailwinds. In China and India alone, 20 million new legal-drinking-age consumers enter the market each year. Storied brands like Jack Daniel’s from Brown-Forman (NYSE: BF.B) and Jameson from Pernod Ricard (OTC: PDRDF) have immense consumer loyalty and global reach. Furthermore, companies are adapting to health trends with non-alcoholic brand extensions, such as Heineken’s (OTC: HEINY) successful Heineken Zero. While the industry over-leveraged in a misguided attempt to gain pricing power over distributors, balance sheets are firming, and companies like Brown-Forman are initiating share buybacks.
Nestlé (a test of patience): The investment case for Nestlé (OTC: NSRGY) is a bet on the company’s ability to navigate challenges and return to its historical operational excellence. The company faces headwinds from the rise of GLP-1 weight-loss drugs, which could dampen food consumption. However, Nestlé is leveraging its formidable R&D capabilities to address this, developing a line of products to restore protein levels for GLP-1 users. The investment thesis rests on the belief that its vast global distribution, iconic brands in emerging markets (like Maggi noodles), and a renewed focus on its four founding pillars—innovation, renovation, communication, and cost management—will allow it to overcome recent underperformance.
Ashtead (a secular consolidator): The thesis for Ashtead Group (LSE: AHT) is a secular, not cyclical, one. The equipment rental industry is undergoing a long-term structural shift away from owned fleets toward leased ones. This trend is driven by increasing regulatory complexity and maintenance requirements, which are pushing small, mom-and-pop operators out of the business. Ashtead, as a major consolidator, acquires these smaller players and improves their efficiency by deploying technology like telematics for fleet management. This creates a long runway for growth as the industry continues to consolidate.
Let’s go deeper.
Transcript
The following transcript has been lightly edited for readability.
Tom Russo: I must say this is a strange time. It is as weird as I can ever remember. The vast sums are daunting. Philip Morris had the courage to announce their recently approved capital budget, and they said that they were spending $37 million on a facility in North Carolina, which will generate 74 jobs. But $37 million. I think the same-day number for AI capital spending might have been $350 billion.
And then if you think about what’s actually going on with the recent exchange with AMD, a large portion of it is options. Not even a proper investment of equity, but the possibility of getting equity later on exchange. That was an unusual characteristic. And there are so many strange aspects that I ponder.
Just last week, the University of Chicago sold its CRSP data fields. Now, depending on how much number crunching the group here does, CRSP is the record, the DNA of reporting back what equities have done since the dawn of time. Highly prized, and they had to sell it to fund their program. They reported at the same time that they miscued on asset allocation, which you would think a leader in financial theory might get right. And for 10 years in a row, they ended up with a deeper deficit each year. The story goes on. It’s not a normal time.
Then if you think about what your clients might want from the government, they’re not really weighing in with a particularly happy look either. The slowdown of spending by the government on SEC issues is potentially threatening. The enforcement division of the SEC is less funded. The proposals are to offer 401(k) investors private placements without regard to sophistication. The list goes on. And ironically, the market just doesn’t stop. And I think that’s a continuation of the availability of money from the federal level that works its way across valuations, consumption, and demand.
John Mihaljevic: And Tom, you have talked about the capacity to suffer in the past, and many of us have suffered, at least in relative terms.
Tom: Yes.
John: And there’s a specific case study you shared a few slides on, Weetabix [now a subsidiary of Post Holdings].
Tom: Yes.
John: Maybe you could talk a little bit about that as well.
Tom: That is a keystone story about what we look for and what we aspire to see. It was a great investment; plus, it worked for the right reasons. So that’s a great segue.
It’s consistent with how I’ve always run the business, which goes back to when I first met Warren Buffett in 1983 at Stanford Business School and his partner, Charlie Munger at Stanford Law school, where I was a student of both at the time. And Warren’s first words when he showed up to our class, Jack McDonald’s class at Value Investing, was that there’s only one break that the government gives investors. So make sure you process that as part of your objective. And that’s the non-taxation of unrealized gains.
So our turnover is sub-5% a year. It’s quite low, and it’s quite low on purpose. We seek businesses that have the capacity to reinvest internally. That way, the money doesn’t have to come out and find another home. So what we start looking for is businesses that have the capacity to absorb capital. And then we look for businesses where the consumer doesn’t believe there to be an adequate substitute. That there isn’t an “across the street,” as Warren says. There’s no “across the street” to Weetabix.
Now, there shouldn’t be because I completely researched the audience for the cereal about 30 years ago when we owned 20% of the company. But it’s quite clear that there are maybe three extra consumers of the product outside of England. And so it literally had no reinvestment opportunities at all. But to their credit, they realized that and just let cash build. And over the years that we owned it, we had to overcome some research issues. The first one was would anybody else around the world eat it? And the answer was no.
So what’s next? Do they have any particular desire to spend the funds on other things? No. And so they just ran it; they ran it well. The EBITDA over the course of 21 years—and anyone who has the slide pack can take a look, the numbers are all there in front of you—it simply went from $19 million to $65 million in EBITDA. Cash built from $17 million to $102 million. And along came a leverage buyer.
Then the family patriarch who ran the business so well for the company with such discipline was starting to bump up against some interesting dynamics with private equity, which is that the benefit of the hard work was going to his siblings and relatives, and he, the CEO, was not receiving the full value of what he was delivering. And so he started to feel a little interested in talking to private equity, and soon enough, they had a buyer and off it went.
And it was interesting, had they been able and comfortable with buying back stock over the period we owned the stock, instead of a compound of 11.5% over 20 years, the results would have been closer to 19% if they had just taken all their free cash each year and bought back stock. And yet they felt uncomfortable doing that relative to outside shareholders, and it is what it is. It was a great company. I look for them wherever we can find them.
Audience member: I have a question about the spirits industry, which I know you’re very familiar with. I would like to get your perspective on consumption trends and whether these businesses are impaired.
Tom: The question, just to repeat, was, are you kidding? How can you own spirits companies? Are you kidding? How can you own beer companies? That’s just crazy.
Audience member: No, no. I would just like your perspective on the consumption trends and also specifically about tequila because I know about Becle Group specifically and all the surplus agave there is. The valuations seem quite compelling now and would appreciate some perspective.
Tom: Thank you. I remember years ago, I went to a forum like this at the University of Pennsylvania, and the person who spoke next to me was asked, are you stupid? How could you possibly? And he turned, and he said he learned a long time ago to survive in the investment business, you have to be able to remember that you’re not nearly so smart as they think you are when things are going well, and you’re not nearly so dumb as they think you are when they’re not. And just find what you think are the factors, research them, and then go forward.
Now, it probably is one of those investments that’s awfully close to what Warren talks about as being “buy, hold, or too difficult to know.” But we’ve spent 25 years investing in Philip Morris, and the same question came back time and again on, are you kidding me? What about the lawsuit they just lost or the regulatory environment? And our sense there was, they have this exceptionally strong global business. The conversation that we’ll have about spirits is a US-centric discussion. But if you step back for a second, what are things outside the US that might be encouraging?
One is that China and India both will have 20 million-plus legal drinking age consumers enter their country as they come of age. And so there’s a huge pool of interested consumers. Now, you have to be careful and not fall into the trap of what you might have thought as a kid: if you can sell everyone one stick of gum in China, it would be quite a fortune. I don’t want to sound like that, but there’s an element of it. There are markets that are worth paying attention to.
And in our portfolio, we have meaningful positions in Heineken, in Pernod Ricard, in Brown-Forman—a smaller position, but still important. And so they each have different components to their portfolio. I’d say the industry itself collectively deserves some negative marks because they, in almost all cases, believed that by getting bigger, they would be able to impose themselves on retail and increase the size of the checks that they were given in exchange for their spirits. And that has just not turned out to be the case. But the industry ended up highly leveraged from that, which is too bad.
Brown-Forman just last week announced a $700 million share buyback, and there would be a lot more of that. To step back now, because it’s a question that a lot of people here have asked about, so it’s worth the time. But it all kicked off with the surgeon general, as he was departing office, who threw a random note across the files saying that any amount of alcohol consumed is carcinogenic. And that went into the public domain, and off it went. So that’s headwind number one. Number two is the general health migration of consumers. They drink Spindrift, not Coca-Cola. They have all sorts of choices. And so there’s been a balkanization of demand.
But it’s interesting, with spirits, the actual number in aggregate is less volatile than what the categories are showing. And so there’s some category swapping about. And it wasn’t that long ago that red wine was cited as a beverage that, in moderation, is good for you. It lubricates the arteries. So there are countervailing forces. We simply think that storied brands like Jack Daniel’s or Jameson’s do 12 to 15 million cases a year. They’re high consumer repurchase. They will show their strength as they continue to work their way through, believe it or not, COVID-related difficulties in terms of the trade channel being weak. But they’ll work their way through that. And we suspect that as that happens, the balance sheets will firm and maybe accelerate if more choose to buy back stock.
They’re reasonably sized investments. I think the whole category might be 10% of assets under management. And Heineken has, as I said, the 20 million consumers coming down the path both in China and in India. They have a joint venture with a dominant Chinese brewer in China where they represent for that company all the business on the premium end, which wraps around the Heineken brand. And that business has really been on fire, and it represents about 7% of their current earnings per share. And so you have a direct play on the highest end of the most popular brand portfolio in China. And one outsider risk that I don’t think is particularly discussed or factored in is, will they suffer in some trade war as a result of what’s going on elsewhere in China? Hope not, but the consumer shows a willingness and excitement over their brands, and that division will grow at a very sharp rate unless it becomes politicized.
John: Tom, related to that, I’m wondering if we accept that the health trend is a long-term trend, does it make sense to differentiate more between the hard spirits companies and the beer companies? Because the beer companies I feel like can still ride that trend. They can have things like Heineken 0.0. I’m not aware of Jack Daniel’s Zero. So is that a way to think about maybe aligning with the trend somewhat? Because I believe the beer companies are also quite inexpensive at the moment.
Tom: Yes, it’s interesting. You’re absolutely right. The lowering of alcohol has created quite a stir within the beer industry through a brand called Athletic, and then there’s Heineken 0.0, which created the category. And so that’s making its rounds, and it’s creating new excitement. They’ve spun off another variant from that, which in each case, they all share the same bottling, they all share the same labels, the red star, and all the rest. So it’s a family of brands. And this one’s called Optimum, and it’s a fortified water. So there’s Heineken stepping yet again into the outer areas and finding new ways to exploit their brand and their consumer activation.
They go to market with a very strong partnership with Formula One. Nestlé goes to market with a powerful Formula One sponsorship. Let me ask you, do any people here know what Formula One is? If not, go see the movie with Brad Pitt. And it’s a very exciting, huge global platform that they each enjoy. And it’s hard for Americans to get a sense for some of this stuff. But for example, in India right now, Diageo—someone was asking me about Diageo—is rumored in the newspaper to be a possible seller of their stake in Indian cricket and suggested that if it were to be so sold, it might be worth $2 billion. Now that’s complete hearsay in a newspaper. But that, plus the notion that the birth rate will deliver such consumption into the market, are things that I think help provide a tailwind up against what are without question large headwinds, as the gentleman in the back asked about.
Audience member: Who teaches the value investing class at Stanford today?
Tom: I went to Stanford for business and law school, and it has all sorts of glories and wonders, mainly in the high-tech world. But you just have to give credit to Columbia for its extraordinary group of adjunct professors who share ideas across the entire range of investments. And so under one roof, you have expertise, and I don’t think that’s found anywhere else. Certainly not to the level of excellence that they are able to generate given the fact that so many of you right here live within a zip code of Morningside Heights. So it’s a great question. I gave that class at Stanford as a visiting lecturer once a year for 25 years and have stopped now. It was great. And every one of those classes, they think of me as Mr. Weetabix. So that’s been kind of fun. “Oh, you’re the Weetabix guy.”
Audience member: As you know, there’s a lot of attention and noise about OpenAI and LLMs. I look at your portfolio and your largest investment in the tech sector appears to be Google. I’d like for you to share your thoughts about your investment in Google. Is it the leading horse in that sector?
Tom: Well, we like it. We like the people who run it from the very start. When they went public, they actually had the chance to follow the bankers, but they didn’t. They went with a dual-voting class, and they said they wanted to do it because they wanted to have the ability to suffer Wall Street criticism when a moonshot, which they specialized in researching in the early days, consumed nothing but massive amounts of capital and reported losses. They didn’t want to be detracted from their mission, which is to see these businesses through.
And the company today is full of the outcome of those early efforts, whether it’s Android, the cloud, or AI. Sergey was among the authors, the originators of AI. And he came back to Google some months ago to breathe a new shot of vigor into it. They have breadth and they also have depth, and they have a frame of reference that allows them to pursue until they succeed. And others have a more on-again, off-again approach because they have to wait for capital funding. They have a massive balance sheet. Even when they were threatened with lawsuits from the antitrust of Europe, Chrome came along and said, “That’s okay, we’ll give them $35 billion for that business.” Well, that was just a small business and it wasn’t recognized for how much wealth and how much impact it would have. And I think you have investment spending across a variety of different areas that will bear fruit, and we give them great credit for that perseverance.
And by the way, that is the story about the capacity to suffer. It’s not because investing isn’t an interesting, fun business. It’s because there are massive amounts of time when the businesses that you’re investing in do nothing but generate losses. Those losses suppress the reported profits, and anybody whose options as a manager of a public company strike over a near-term horizon are going to be very concerned about taking steps that might in any way jeopardize the value of what they will make off their options. And so the worst outcome we find happens when the person in that position doesn’t take the investment that they should, and they leave the door open for a competitor to come along.
Charlie Munger has an expression: “You should never give your loyal client and consumer a reason to look elsewhere for satisfaction.” And so one of the things is you don’t have the ability to not spend money in some cases because it’s your duty to protect and to extend the franchise. I once asked Pete Coors, head of Coors, how it felt to be the third boat in a two-boat race. He wasn’t happy. He said, “It’s not.” He said, “Because you have to understand,” he grew up, he said, as a young man racing yachts in Newport, Rhode Island. We think of him as Golden, Colorado, “Rocky Mountain High.” But he was a nautical racer. And he said, “As a racer, any time you have a compelling advantage, and you look back and your distantly losing counterpart takes a barren tack, you as the leader have a responsibility to cover that risk that they may actually know something.” Nine times out of ten they don’t, so you’ve just given up some of your advantage. But if you don’t cover the early signs of that risk and it actually is the better course, you won’t catch them, and you’ll see the slow old boat go across the finish before you.
And that happens in business all the time. A great example of that is General Mills. They had this extraordinary franchise called Yoplait yogurt, and it was several hundred million dollars worth of EBITDA generated from it. And at some point, they heard about a startup in upstate New York. It was a new form of yogurt. And as the category captain, they went out and they took a look, and they realized that for $12 million, they could initiate a business that would be available to combat the startup on day one. It would have cost them $12 million, and it would have been uncovered by the income statement. They actually had pledged a certain amount, and they didn’t think they had the ability to cover it because it would have had an adverse effect. So they let it happen without their presence. They let it happen the second year without their presence, and by the third year, it didn’t matter because the company that was threatening entered, succeeded, and then maintained a brand share under the name Chobani. And of course, today Chobani is the titan, and General Mills has sold Yoplait off on a discard basis. And it never should have happened. And that’s exactly the moment where when we talk about the capacity to suffer, we want our managers to go in at a moment like that and come with all barrels blazing to make sure that they have a chance to keep the client. Long answer, sorry, but it’s a fun subject.
Audience member: I wondered if you could just give us a little insight on Nestlé. It’s a great case study, frankly, of... how can you be so stupid as to own Nestlé? Okay, back up. Go ahead. Start over. Basically, my question is that if you look at the track record of Nestlé for the last seven to eight years, you’ve seen a compression in valuation. The returns have been pretty mediocre, frankly. Management hasn’t exactly covered themselves in glory, heavily dependent on coffee, and then they got rid of their bottled water franchise. I guess my question is, at a point, you could say, “Yes, Nestlé is something that everybody needs and all the rest of it,” but from a capital allocation and from a consumer trends perspective, what are you really buying? Are you buying basically just a conglomerate that has in theory good capital allocation methodology for consumers, or are you getting something that is kind of a bit of a dinosaur today? I’m being a bit provocative, but I’m curious because I buy Heineken.
Tom: It’s a good question because against all the theoretical issues we can talk about, there’s something right in front of us called GLP-1. So it’s a different world. They now have a line of products that are designed to restore protein levels for those who have migrated over to GLP-1. And we’ll see whether that science lab business that they have, which is extensive and market-leading and the most that you can find anywhere else, will pay for its rent because they haven’t really unearthed provocative new forms of hydration or feeding.
That said, there are 180 countries where it operates, there are 150,000 employees. And in all emerging markets you go to, you will find that they have a substantial presence, often shared with Unilever, but nonetheless, their breakfast cereal, Maggi chicken noodles, I think does several hundred million cases a day, and it serves an extremely important and vital role. Now, is it going through a deep review at the moment? Yes. And we’re waiting for outcomes to see what they come back with. But it’s going to require that they go back to the very earliest stages where they had four principles. One was innovation, renovation, communication. That’s the “Formula One” under the brand Kit Kat, and so they’re quite excited about that. And then cost management. Those are the four pillars on which the business was run when we first owned the shares 20-plus years ago. And they’ve wandered from it. That’s where we are today. We’re going to give them a little rope to see.
Audience member: I saw you were a shareholder of Ashtead. Can you explain the rationale, please?
Tom: Well, it starts with what their business is. And their business is in the equipment leasing area. And what you’ve had over 40 years is this migration away from owned fleets to leased fleets. And the government has been the catalyst driving much of that transition over time because they keep coming up with new requirements for maintenance and for the specification of the equipment that you must have if you’re going to sell a certain thing to a certain client. And the small mom-and-pops which populated the industry for decades are aging out. And so they’re looking for ways to monetize their business. And so you have a growing pressure of regulatory requirements that won’t stop. And then you have a group of people who have reached the end of their rope in terms of productive deployment of that service.
And you have technology. Technology has come along, and the equipment can self-audit in terms of when they have a cycle of repair going, when they should take the products elsewhere to be fixed. And so the telematics and the services that allow you to delight your consumer go up when those small mom-and-pops sell to Ashtead. And they increasingly sell to Ashtead or to URI. We have invested in one, not the other. And I guess on that score, it’s the management from our perspective had a more deliberate and foreseeable rollout. So we’re quite impressed. They’re reincorporating in the US, which is fine with us. It may or may not affect the share price, but it’s probably a good thing in terms of the fact that they do so much of their business through acquisitions. It makes it easier to merge in, I guess.
But they have contracts for, you know, as does Martin Marietta Materials. Now we can pair it with another position which is close to the same thing. I think Martin may be close to a 10% position and Ashtead maybe five. But they both have huge exposure to the ICE and the other provisions that funded early work, and now they don’t need anyone to fund it because the AI is funding everything. But they’re good businesses. And the financing for their fleet has changed over time. And so it’s more a prepayment. So they have less balance sheet risk than they once did as they maintain their fleet of updated machinery.
Audience member: A question about the liquor companies’ capital allocation. I think you talked about the volatility among the categories of the liquors. So, in my opinion, when a category starts to flounder, the liquor companies have no control over that. So if you were the CEO, let’s say, of the largest liquor companies, how would you think about long-term reinvestment, capital allocation in terms of brand acquisition or category acquisition? Thank you.
Tom: It’s a really important question. The belief that inspired most of the integration that took place—the assembly of these groups—was that as a result of joining forces, they would get more than their fair share from the distributors who were increasingly large and powerful and demanded generous terms of the trade. And the trade, this is the Brown family, this is the Ricard family, this is Diageo, the producers, wanted some way to fend against powerful buyers. And they thought by owning four categories—vodka, scotch whiskey, champagne, and cognac—if each of them had that, then they would be able to name the prices, and that hasn’t turned out to be the case. And so over time, they’re going to reorganize their portfolios. I think Pernod Ricard folks will tell you it was a good acquisition, but they did buy a bourbon company that was blended with peanut butter. So you can see how far astray things got.
Someone asked me about Becle—$100 tequila in a hacienda overlooking vast fields of wealth. And those are the projected imagery that people like. But we actually like the businesses as well for another reason. Those brands are very powerful. People bond with the brand. So if you ever go to a bar and somebody calls out for the drink, they’ll say they want a Beefeater’s martini with a twist and an olive, dirty. Whatever that all means, people are listening, “Oh, you’re that kind of drinker. Okay, good. You’re that.” And people like that definition through association. It could be whether you drive a Ferrari, whether you have a Montblanc pen, and wherever it is that you have something like that, a certain type of watch, someone from our firm will be next to you when you choose to buy it, and they’ll ask you, “Why’d you buy that?” And your answer should be because we’re complete nuts about this brand. That’s our hope.
Audience member: I think you were just answering that, but my question was more, you’re focused on a lot of consumer investments. In today’s age of digital advertising and social media, the barrier to entry for any new brand is far lower than what it used to be historically. Would it be possible for you to share an example where you looked at a brand and felt there was very little disruption risk, and how do you figure that out?
Tom: I think the digitalization of promotion, of advertising messages and all the rest, actually becomes more effective. I remember almost 10 years ago, we met with the head of Heineken North America at the time. I said, “How are things going?” And the answer was, “You won’t believe it.” He said, “The world’s changed so much. We can’t do anything without Google and Facebook.” Now, that was 10 years ago. And they’ve incorporated those tools and have had a release of their required reinvestment back in brand building because billions of dollars of copy was done. If you went in and asked Ogilvy to do a proper survey, it’s decades to do and it’s billions to pay for.
And what’s happening is people internally are equipping themselves with tools that deliver at a fraction of the price. But the pricing across all industries is really going to surprise people. We’ve got... what is the name of that company in China that claims to come to market at 1% of the cost of the large enterprises? Temu? Yes. We don’t know. It could be. The billions could be leaking out. And I think the same is true. But in the case of examples, I would say the example is on the positive side: getting the right message to the right person at the right time at the right price, because you know exactly what they did the last time they faced that same decision. You just play off that knowledge with higher certainty and more effective messaging.
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