We are delighted to share the fourth report in our Industry Primers series, this one on aerospace. The series exists to help fundamental, long-term investors expand and deepen their circle of competence, one industry at a time, and your feedback on what was useful and on which industries to cover next shapes what we produce. Two podcast episodes complement the report, the first telling the industry's story and the second digging deeper into the fundamentals from an investor's standpoint. The companion slide deck (free to access) and the full research report (members only) follow below.
Most of the value in aerospace sits with the companies paid over an aircraft's working life rather than at its delivery. At the September 18, 2026 close the forty companies featured in the report were worth about $2.3tn, and the six engine companies among them about $941bn, nearly twice the $499bn of the seven listed airframers. GE Aerospace (NYSE: GE), at $326bn, was worth about as much as Boeing (NYSE: BA) at $157bn and Airbus (Euronext Paris: AIR) at $176bn together. World air traffic, which drives demand, grew 6.2 percent a year from 1970 to 2019, and Boeing and Airbus held a backlog of about 16,100 large jets at August 31, 2026, about 12 years of 2025's deliveries.
Over the long run the industry beat the market, and inside it the owners of small certified monopolies in the supply chain compounded far faster than the airframers. Kenneth French's value-weighted portfolio of US-listed aircraft, engine and parts makers returned 13 percent a year from July 1926 to July 2026 against 10 percent for the market, and beat it in 63 of 80 rolling twenty-year windows, with deeper falls. Over the twenty years from September 29, 2006 to September 18, 2026, with dividends reinvested, TransDigm Group (NYSE: TDG) returned 27 percent a year, HEICO (NYSE: HEI, HEI.A) common stock 21 percent and Safran (Euronext Paris: SAF) 18 percent, against 11 percent for the S&P 500 total return. Airbus returned 12 percent and Boeing 6.5 percent, and five of the seven listed airframers sit in the bottom third of the report's twenty-year board.
The companion deck. Aerospace: a self-contained summary of the report.
Key findings
The report follows the industry along its supply chain, from the airframe and the engine to the certified part and the forging, and every figure in it is dated and sourced in the notes. These are the main findings of each part.
An airplane is sold once and flown for decades, and the three businesses in its chain are paid at different points in its life. The 737 first flew on April 9, 1967, and Boeing delivered 447 more in 2025. An airframe program spends tens of billions of dollars before its first delivery, and in 2025 Boeing Commercial Airplanes lost $7.1bn on $41bn of revenue. An engine maker sells the engine thinly and is repaid over the shop visits, the scheduled overhauls of later decades, and services were 75 percent of revenue at GE Aerospace's Commercial Engines & Services. The owner of a proprietary part, one it alone is certified to supply, prices it against the cost of a grounded airplane. (Part I, Orientation)
The industry's structure was set by its first regulator, and it narrowed to a duopoly because each generation of airplane cost more than the last. The Air Commerce Act of May 20, 1926 made the government the licensor of every airworthy design, and the Air Mail Act of June 12, 1934 separated the airframer from its engine maker. Pan Am's order of 1966 for twenty-five 747s launched a program that took Boeing's payroll down to 38,690 in 1971. Rolls-Royce (LSE: RR.) went into receivership on February 4, 1971 on a fixed-price engine, and the engine makers then shared each program's risk with partners, so the three Western makers of large turbofans of 1970 are the three of 2026. (Part II, Evolution, Chapters 4 and 5)
In the century's first quarter Boeing lost its parity with Airbus through a loss of engineering control, and the constraint moved from demand to supply. The two makers split 17,140 deliveries almost exactly from 2003 to 2018, and Boeing's share has been between 22 and 43 percent in every year since 2019. The 737 MAX was grounded from March 2019 to November 2020, and after the door plug of January 5, 2024 the FAA froze 737 output at about 38 a month. The top of the chain is now buying back its constrained suppliers: Boeing bought Spirit AeroSystems in December 2025, and GE Aerospace agreed in September 2026 to buy the castings maker Consolidated Precision Products (CPP) for $12bn. (Part II, Evolution, Chapters 6 and 7)
The report's four cases show the industry's way to compound and its three ways to fail. TransDigm bought proprietary parts with large aftermarket content, priced them on their value, financed the purchases with debt and returned what the businesses did not need, and its EBITDA As Defined, its own non-GAAP measure, rose from $164m in fiscal 2005 to $4,760m in fiscal 2025. Its exposed flank is the price, which the Pentagon's Inspector General contested in 2019. Rolls-Royce failed in 1971 on a fixed-price engine sold to one customer, and Boeing's crisis grew from two decades of decisions on where engineering sat, what the regulator was told and where the cash went. Bombardier (TSX: BBD.B) built a good airplane in the CSeries and could not fund it. (Part II, Evolution, Chapter 8)
The profit in the chain goes to whoever owns certified content that the fleet consumes. Three contractual facts decide the split: who buys the part (the airframer once, or the operator one unit at a time), whether the position is sole-source for the life of the aircraft type, and how much aftermarket content the part carries. FY2025 margins on each company's own measure run from a 17 percent loss at Boeing Commercial Airplanes and 10 percent at Airbus's commercial business through 21 to 27 percent at the engine makers' commercial units to 47 percent on GAAP operating income at TransDigm. The engine makers take two-thirds to three-quarters of their commercial revenue from services. (Part III, Structure & Economics, Chapter 9)
Traffic compounds, orders swing far more than deliveries, and the backlog absorbs each shock. World revenue passenger kilometers rose from 460bn in 1970 to 8,664bn in 2019, fell 66 percent in 2020 and first exceeded 2019 only in 2024. The combined book-to-bill, orders over deliveries, ran from 0.42 in 2009 to 3.1 in 2005 and 2007, and 33,574 net orders against 23,109 deliveries from 2006 to 2025 built the backlog. The aftermarket carries the cycle, and Rolls-Royce's Civil services revenue rose 21 percent in 2025 on flying hours up 8 percent. On July 29, 2026 Aengus Kelly of AerCap Holdings (NYSE: AER) expected widebody retirements to rise, which lowers the demand for spares on the oldest types. (Part III, Structure & Economics, Chapter 10)
The three business models earn at opposite ends of an aircraft's life, and the moats that pay belong to the owners of sole-source parts and installed engines. Every clean-sheet airliner launched after the 777 that has delivered was late, by one and a half to three and a half years, or never delivered. On one definition the proprietary owners' returns on invested capital never fell below 11 percent from FY2015 to FY2025, while Spirit went from 29 percent in 2015 to an after-tax operating loss of 78 percent of its invested capital in 2024. The check on a sole-source price is the Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), a certified copy sold below the original maker's price, on which HEICO's Flight Support Group built $3.1bn of net sales in fiscal 2025. (Part III, Structure & Economics, Chapters 11 to 13)
Airbus and Boeing hold the same position in the chain and have used it very differently. On €73bn of 2025 revenue Airbus earned a 9.7 percent EBIT Adjusted margin and ended the year with €12bn of net cash. Boeing's $4.3bn of GAAP earnings from operations included a one-time gain of $9.6bn, so the year was an operating loss of about $5.3bn without it. The position shows inside the conglomerates too, Pratt & Whitney at a 7.9 percent margin beside Collins at 16 percent within RTX (NYSE: RTX). In materials the Engine Products segment of Howmet Aerospace (NYSE: HWM) earned 33 percent on adjusted EBITDA, and Hexcel (NYSE: HXL), which builds to the airframers' rates, 9.1 percent. (Part IV, The Players, Chapter 14)
The industry's great compounders are the builders and allocators of its supply chain, who bought or built small certified monopolies and priced them. Nicholas Howley's TransDigm returned 27 times with dividends reinvested from March 2006 to April 2018, 31 percent a year against 8.3 percent for the S&P 500 total return. At HEICO, Laurans Mendelson and his sons Eric and Victor built a company with fiscal 1990 sales of "just over $26 million" into one with about $4.5bn, and $100 invested on October 31, 1990 became $128,481 by October 31, 2025 on the company's own table, 23 percent a year. Mark Donegan's Precision Castparts returned 21 percent a year from March 2002 to March 2015, with earnings per share up 16-fold, before Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A, BRK.B) bought it for $235 a share in cash. (Part IV, The Players, Chapter 15)
The best recent records belong to leaders who rebuilt companies around their installed base, and the levers behind the top records are few. John Plant separated Howmet from its aluminum rolling business in April 2020, cut its long-term debt by about half by 2025 and reduced its diluted share count from 463m to 406m, and Howmet has returned 42 percent a year since February 2019 against 16 percent for the S&P 500 total return. Larry Culp's GE returned 25 percent a year from September 2018. TransDigm alone publishes its hurdles: an acquisition must earn about 20 percent on the equity, and options vest fully only on 17.5 percent a year of growth in operating performance per share. Plant's letters print the price paid in every buyback. (Part IV, The Players, Chapters 15 and 16)
Much of what sets the chain's terms has no share price. The French and German states each held 11 percent of Airbus at March 31, 2025, and the United States and the European Union fought over launch aid at the World Trade Organization from 2004 until arbitrators authorized countermeasures in 2019 and 2020. The FAA's freeze of 737 output in January 2024 made the regulator the judge of an airframer's output as well as its designs. Precision Castparts, inside Berkshire, reported $11bn of revenue in 2025, more than Howmet's $8.3bn, and the lessors own just over half of the commercial fleet by industry estimates. (Part IV, The Players, Chapter 17)
Most arguments about an aerospace company are arguments about a definition, and the cash is the audit of the estimates behind the earnings. Each company labels its margin its own way, from Airbus's EBIT Adjusted to TransDigm's EBITDA As Defined, and an air-show tally is not a firm order: at Farnborough in July 2026 Reuters counted 173 aircraft for Boeing, against firm July orders of 38. Boeing still uses program accounting, which spreads a program's cost over the units it expects to deliver, and Rolls-Royce's 2017 operating profit was £1,175m under the old accounting standard and £321m under IFRS 15, with no change in cash. Boeing returned $64bn to shareholders from 2013 to 2019, 133 percent of its $48bn of free cash flow, then burned $38bn from 2019 to 2025 as its diluted shares rose from 565m to 762m. (Part V, Speaking the Language)
An aerospace company is analyzed from the installed base upward, and the market pays for proprietary aftermarket margin and scarce capacity more than for aftermarket revenue. At the September 18, 2026 close the featured companies traded at a median of about 20 times FY2025 EBITDA, from 14 times for the airframers to 29 times for the proprietary-component makers. Across sixteen companies the aftermarket share explains little of the multiple, with an r-squared of 0.10, and a US listing counts about as much, a median of 26 times against 14 elsewhere. Strategic buyers paid 13 to 17 times trailing EBITDA from 2011 to 2025, and GE Aerospace's price for CPP, about 26 times expected 2027 EBITDA before synergies, breaks that band. (Part VI, Analysis & Valuation, Chapters 21 and 22)
The base rates sort the industry by position in the chain, and the suppliers compounded on growth while the airframers rode margin recoveries that the next crisis reversed. French's portfolio beat the market by 2.4 points a year over the century but lost five of eleven decades. Across thirty-six listed companies over the twenty years to September 18, 2026 the median returned about 12 percent a year, from 17 to 27 percent at the proprietary-component makers to a median of 6.5 percent at the airframers. Revenue growth added 13 points a year to HEICO's return from FY2009 to FY2025, while Boeing's 25 percent a year from FY2009 to FY2018 turned into minus 5.1 percent a year to FY2025. (Part VI, Analysis & Valuation, Chapter 23)
In aerospace, artificial intelligence is so far a risk factor in the filings rather than a business line, and its largest effect has come through power demand for data centers. Across 27 FY2025 annual filings of the featured companies the median names artificial intelligence once, against about 44 uses of "cyber," and Curtiss-Wright (NYSE: CW) writes that it does not currently use AI in the design and development of its products. Certification keeps machine learning off flight-critical functions until about the end of the decade. The data-center build-out pulls on the same foundries as the jet engine, and Howmet's Gas Turbines revenue rose 25 percent to $944m in 2025 and 38 percent in the second quarter of 2026. (Part VII, The AI Inflection)
Nearly every aerospace failure in the record is a program bet larger than the balance sheet, a loss of engineering control or leverage carried into a traffic shock. The RB211 and the CSeries were bets of the first kind, and each failure showed first in the inventory, the customer advances, the regulator's letters and the production rate. Of the eleven debates the report sets out, the one the market waits on is the aftermarket: in the first half of 2026 the engine and parts makers grew by a fifth to a quarter, and on September 14, 2026 Melius Research forecast growth, as published reports of its note quote it, in "the high-single-digit percentage range next year." RTX's chief executive, Chris Calio, said of the engine business model on July 23, 2026, "I don't think that, that is the best model going forward." (Part VIII, Risks & Debates)
The appendices give the analyst the working tools: the investable universe of 82 listed companies along the chain, with the forty featured companies marked and the unlisted forces beside them; a due-diligence checklist of twenty-six questions in the order of the analysis of Chapter 21; a reading course of the companies' letters, proxies and investor days, the accident and regulatory reports, books, hearings and calls; and the numbered notes that source the report. (Appendices)
How to use this primer
The report does not need to be read in order. Suggested paths:
a generalist with limited time, Parts I and VI plus the checklist in Appendix B;
a reader interested in the history, Part II;
an accountant, Part V with Chapter 11;
an analyst working on a specific company, Chapter 14, then Parts III, V, and VI in order;
a risk officer, Part VIII with Chapter 8;
a technologist, Part VII;
a reader who came for the owner-operators, Chapters 15 and 16, with Chapter 23 for what their records are worth against the index.
Every chapter ends with a "What to remember" box, and the twenty-seven boxes read in sequence summarize the report. The checklist follows the order of the analytical procedure in Chapter 21, and its five questions on the installed base and the company's position come first, because in this industry the money is made on the installed base rather than on the delivery.
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This content is published by MOI Global for educational purposes only. It is not investment advice, an offer, or a solicitation, and no security mentioned herein is recommended for purchase or sale. The publisher and contributors may hold positions in securities discussed. Figures are believed accurate as of the dates stated but are not warranted; readers should verify all data against primary sources before relying on it. Nothing herein constitutes legal, tax, or accounting advice.


