European Investing Summit 2025: Diageo, Domino's, Novo Nordisk, Topicus, Volkswagen, and More
The case for Europe + idea highlights from 14th-annual conference
What are some of the most compelling value-oriented investment ideas in Europe right now? That is the question we sought to answer with 20+ great speakers from the MOI Global network of great investors last week.
Before diving into the specific idea theses, you may enjoy Brian Chingono’s case for European equities (as well as his thesis on SMCP). Brian’s analysis is based on the deep research process of highly regarded global asset management firm Verdad Advisers, where he serves as Partner, Director of Quantitative Research, and Europe Portfolio Manager.
Brian acknowledges Europe’s structural challenges, including a productivity gap with the US and recent energy shocks, that have fueled a pessimistic narrative. This sentiment has led to capital outflows, evidenced by weak FX and fund flows, and has compressed European valuations to a historical trough. The European market now trades at a 54% P/B discount to the US, a spread far wider than the 50-year historical average discount of 18%.
The core of Brian’s argument is that the median European company is fundamentally stronger than its median US counterpart, a fact obscured by the US market’s tech-heavy, market-cap-weighted structure. The median European firm has higher EBIT margins (8.4% vs 5.9%), ROA (24.9% GP/Assets vs 19.9%), and estimated three-year EBIT growth (12.9% vs 10.3%). Despite these superior metrics, they trade at lower P/B (1.46x vs 1.97x) and EV/EBITDA (9.8x vs 11.7x). This “location discount” is acute in the value segment, where European firms (<1.0x P/B) are higher quality (18.9% GP/Assets) compared to US value firms (13.1% GP/Assets).
This mispricing creates the potential for mean reversion in the European value-to-growth factor spread, which is currently at an extreme wider than the 2000 dot-com bubble. The opportunity is greatest in European micro-caps, which trade at a 20% discount to their own long-term P/B median (0.62x vs 0.77x). This valuation gap is being exploited by PE, with LBO transactions occurring at an average 12x EV/EBITDA. This represents a 27% premium to public micro-caps (9.4x) and provides a valuation floor, particularly for deep-value names available at 5.0x EV/EBITDA.
Let’s dive in.
Disclaimer
European Investing Summit 2025 was held from October 28 to November 3, 2025. The content of this website is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security. The content is distributed for informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment advice or a recommendation to sell or buy any security or other investment, or undertake any investment strategy. There are no warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or results obtained from any information set forth on this website. BeyondProxy’s officers, directors, employees, and/or contributing authors may have positions in and may, from time to time, make purchases or sales of the securities or other investments discussed or evaluated herein.
SMCP: Accessible Luxury With Margin Upside and High FCF Yield
Brian Chingono of Verdad presented his investment thesis on European equities and SMCP (France: SMCP) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
SMCP is a Parisian fashion holding company operating in the accessible luxury segment with a €485 million market cap. The company manages a global footprint of stores for its brands, including Sandro, Maje, and Claudie Pierlot. SMCP was previously owned by the LVMH-affiliated private equity firm L Catterton. The thesis sees upside potential driven by internal efficiency measures and an eventual recovery in discretionary spending.
The company’s stock appears depressed due to its exposure to consumer discretionary spending, which has been pressured by recent inflation and high interest rates. This specific headwind aligns with the broader consensus pessimism surrounding European equities, which have faced slowing growth, capital outflows, and geopolitical shocks. This environment has left corporate Europe, despite being healthy, trading at a steep discount to US peers.
The investment thesis rests on the view that this pessimism regarding SMCP is overdone. The company is executing efficiency measures and cost-cutting plans which are progressing as expected. Management is targeting adjusted EBIT margin expansion to 10% in 2H 2026, up from 7.1% in 1H 2025. This operational turnaround is stewarded by a capable CFO, a 15-year LVMH veteran who previously served as CFO of Givenchy.
The company exhibits healthy quality metrics, including a 35.6% gross profit to assets ratio. The balance sheet is also actively being deleveraged, with net debt reduced by 13% since December 2024 and 30% since June 2024. Beyond the operational turnaround, a potential upside catalyst exists from the eventual sale of a stake held by creditors of a former shareholder.
Reflecting the macro pressures and pessimism, the shares recently traded at low multiples. The stock was valued at 5.7x EV/EBITDA and 0.4x P/B. This valuation corresponds to a 17.7% FCF yield. This pricing exemplifies the opportunity in European micro-caps, which are trading at discounts to their own history and offer a compelling entry point for value-oriented investors.
Novo Nordisk: Priced for Stability, Ignoring the Strong Pipeline
Ole Søeberg of Nordic Investment Partners presented his investment thesis on Novo Nordisk (Denmark: NOVOB) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Ole analyzes the pharma industry as a potential “growth cluster,” driven by demographic tailwinds as an aging population increases healthcare spending. He notes that while this spending trend is unsustainable, it creates a large opportunity for drugs that promote a “good life” and reduce long-term costs.
The presentation identifies GLP-1s as a key innovation in this area, with potential benefits far beyond their original diabetes and obesity applications, including cardiovascular, cancer suppression, and anti-depressant effects. This market is currently a “two-horse race” between Eli Lilly (LLY) and Novo Nordisk (NVO).
Novo Nordisk, a pioneer in the GLP-1 market with Ozempic and Wegovy, has “fallen out of bed” after its stock price declined 60% from its peak. The company lost its “pole position” to LLY after experiencing “short supply issues” just as LLY launched its Zepbound drug, which Ole notes is currently a “better drug” as an injectable.
The market has since priced NVO for a low-growth future, essentially writing off its pipeline and viewing its potential upside, including MASH and Alzheimer’s treatments, as “birds on the roof.”
Ole highlights that this view may ignore NVO’s pipeline, which could “change the balance” in the race with LLY. NVO’s pill-based Cagrisema, with results expected late this year for a 2026 launch, appears “slightly better” than LLY’s offering based on comparative data.
Furthermore, NVO’s Amycretin (due in 2029) “could also change the game.” The company is also undergoing a management reset, with a new CEO (Mads Dysted) and a new board focused on getting NVO “back on track.” Ole also views the hiring of a top sell-side analyst for IR as a positive step for improving the feedback loop to senior management.
The recent 60% stock price dive has compressed NVO’s valuation. The market appears to be pricing in a 2030 EPS of around 30 DKK, reflecting a “mature stable” business. However, if NVO’s growth forecasts are realized, EPS could be “much higher,” potentially 50+ DKK. Ole presents a scenario where, even on conservative 2028 EPS estimates of 28 DKK, a P/E multiple of 18x (below NVO’s long-term average of 22.5x) would imply a 500 DKK stock price in 2.5 years. With dividends, this suggests a potential 15% CAGR.
While LLY has a higher growth profile, Ole notes NVO “looks more interesting” on recent valuation terms, recently yielding just under 4%.
Marex: Niche Leader in Consolidating Financial Services Market
Daniel Gladiš of Vltava Fund presented his investment thesis on Marex Group (US: MRX) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Marex is a UK-based global financial services platform providing essential market access, liquidity, and infrastructure for institutional clients in the energy, commodity, and financial markets. The company operates four interconnected segments: Clearing Services, Agency & Execution, Market Making, and Hedging & Investment Solutions.
Marex serves ~5,000 active clients and is positioned as a key provider for medium-sized funds, occupying a niche underserved by the largest banks (who require high commission minimums) and smaller independents (who lack global coverage).
The investment thesis rests on high barriers to entry and a favorable, consolidating competitive landscape. It took Marex nearly a decade from its founding to build its initial, small business, highlighting the difficulty of scaling in this space. Competitive intensity has declined, with the number of Futures Commission Merchants (FCMs) falling by about 50% since 2002 while client assets have grown. This consolidation has allowed Marex to become a top-10 FCM in the U.S. by client assets.
Unlike most peers, Marex and its closest competitor, StoneX, are among the few players offering a comprehensive suite across all four service segments.
Marex benefits from long-term secular trends, including the increasing demand for cleared products and derivatives and the general expansion of financial and commodity markets. Near-term business drivers include higher interest rates and market volatility, making the stock an effective bet on future volatility. Growth is achieved through a combination of organic initiatives and a disciplined M&A strategy, with a target 60/40 organic/inorganic mix.
Transformative acquisitions like ED&F Man and the TD Cowen prime brokerage business have expanded its customer base and service offering, driving strong client growth; clients generating >$1M in revenue grew at a 54% CAGR from 2021-2024.
The company has a 10-year track record of strong profit growth through varied market conditions, growing Adjusted PBT from $16 million in 2014 to $321 million in 2024. The business is also becoming more stable; while average monthly PBT has grown, its standard deviation has not grown proportionally, making earnings more predictable. The balance sheet appears highly leveraged, but ~80% of assets are driven by client activity and net out, leaving a modest residual balance sheet.
Marex maintains an investment grade rating and strong regulatory capital ratios (2.42x the requirement). FCF conversion is high, in the mid-90% range.
The opportunity exists because Marex is a UK-based, financial small-cap ($2.2 billion market cap) with a short public history, making it ignored by passive strategies and difficult for outsiders to assess. A recent short report, viewed by the presenter as a “non-issue”, has also applied pressure to the stock. Based on UBS projections, the shares recently traded around $30, or approximately 7.7x 2025E earnings.
These consensus estimates forecast ~10% annual EPS growth based only on organic expansion, and crucially, they do not include any contribution from future M&A. This omission suggests current earnings projections may underestimate the company’s true growth potential.
Domino’s Pizza (UK): Asset-Light, Growing Leader With High FCF Yield
José Antonio Larraz of Equam Capital presented his investment thesis on Domino’s Pizza Group plc (UK: DOM) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Domino’s Pizza Group is the exclusive master franchisee for the UK and Ireland. The company operates a highly asset-light, 100% franchised business model. DPG manages the central supply chain, including dough manufacturing and logistics, as well as national marketing. Franchisees, who are required to source all materials from DPG, run the individual stores. This structure results in low CapEx requirements, with maintenance CapEx below 1% of revenues, and a negative working capital cycle.
DPG holds a dominant position in the UK pizza delivery market with a 54% market share, making it more than 3.5 times the size of its nearest competitor. José highlighted that DPG is strengthening this leadership, having added over 90 stores in the past two years while its two largest branded competitors have seen a net reduction in their store counts.
This scale provides DPG with durable competitive advantages in brand awareness, sourcing efficiencies, and the ability to optimize delivery times, which is a key service metric.
The company’s growth strategy is multi-faceted. The first leg focuses on maximizing revenues from the existing network by improving service, continuous product innovation, and the national rollout of a loyalty program designed to increase average order frequency from 4.3 to over 5.0 times per year. The second leg is expanding the store network in the UK, which remains underpenetrated (53k people/store) compared to markets like the US (28k).
This expansion is targeting smaller towns and splitting existing territories. A third leg involves accelerating growth in Ireland, an even less penetrated market (85k people/store) with an opportunity for over 100 new locations.
DPG is also exploring further growth avenues, including leveraging its supply chain, franchisee network, and 13.5 million active customers to launch a second, non-pizza fast-food brand in the UK. The company is exploring international expansion, signaled by its 12.1% stake in Domino’s Pizza Poland.
José noted the company’s strong FCF generation and commitment to shareholder returns, having distributed 460 million GBP via dividends and buybacks in the last four years, equivalent to 52% of its recent market capitalization.
According to José, the investment opportunity exists because a >50% share price decline, driven by a weak UK consumer environment that has temporarily stalled LFL sales growth, has disconnected the company’s valuation from its fundamentals. He views this slowdown as cyclical. The company’s shares recently traded at historical low multiples of less than 10x P/E and at a FCF yield of approximately 10%. This valuation represents a discount to comparable companies, despite DPG’s market leadership.
The balance sheet remains solid with leverage at approximately 2.0x net debt/EBITDA.
Diageo: Short-Term Noise Obscures Cash-Gushing Quality Business
Alirio Sendrea of Invexcel presented his in-depth investment thesis on Diageo (UK: DGE, US: DEO) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Diageo is the world’s largest premium spirits company, holding a 5% global value share and a 20% share in the premium-and-above segment. The company is 1.7x larger than its closest international peer and possesses an unparalleled portfolio of over 200 brands, including Johnnie Walker, Tanqueray, and Smirnoff, alongside a 34% stake in Moët Hennessy. The company is highly diversified, selling in 180 countries, and has a portfolio heavily weighted (over 60%) towards the premium-and-above segments, which is almost double the global average.
The spirits sector, as Alirio describes, has faced numerous headwinds that have caused it to go from “sunrise to moonlight,” with many fearing it as the “new tobacco.” These challenges include structural issues like consumer moderation and health consciousness (including GLP-1s) and changing Gen Z habits, as well as circumstantial issues like macro pressures on disposable income, inventory destocking after a post-COVID boom, and new tariffs. These factors led to the first US volume decrease in 30 years in 2023, causing valuations to collapse.
Alirio’s thesis argues this pessimism is misplaced, viewing the macro and inventory issues as transitory. He contends the structural shifts are manageable and create opportunities for “drinking less but better,” which favors Diageo’s premium portfolio. The company benefits from formidable moats, including immense scale, which provides bargaining power and a virtuous cycle of reinvestment. Other moats include the high barrier to entry from “aging,” which requires deep pockets to fund maturing inventory, and powerful brands that provide pricing power.
Diageo is leaning into these strengths, increasing its marketing (A&P) spend to 18% of sales while peers pull back, and growing its maturing inventory to drive future premium sales. Financially, Diageo leads its peers with stable operating margins, a higher ROIC, and superior cash conversion (69% EBITDA to CFO vs. 61% for peers). Alirio highlights that the company is prioritizing organic growth, funded by its strong FCF, and is also embarking on an efficiency plan. While leverage (Net Debt/EBITDA) is at the high end of its 2.5-3.0x target range, he views it as manageable and notes potential upside optionality not included in his valuation, such as portfolio restructuring.
Alirio’s valuation starts from a conservative “no-growth” top-line scenario and a normalized 29% operating margin. He values the Moët Hennessy stake at $7.1 billion using an 18x P/E multiple. His target price is derived from an average of three methods: an EV/EBIT (Market) multiple of 17.4x, an EV/EBIT (Transactions) multiple of 20.4x, and a P/FCF multiple of 18x. This methodology yields a target price of 28-29 pounds per share. Compared to a recent price of 1,750p, Alirio believes this offers a decent margin of safety for a quality, moaty business whose long-term profile is being blurred by short-term noise.
Bellway: Well-Capitalized, Quality UK Homebuilder at Cyclical Low
Christian Olesen of Olesen Value Fund presented his investment thesis on Bellway (UK: BWY) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Bellway is a UK-based pure-play homebuilder, the fifth-largest in the country by revenue. The company was founded in 1946 and focuses on single-family homes, typically at a lower mid-range price point. Christian highlights that the company maintains very little exposure (less than 5%) to the London market. This is relevant as UK home prices outside of London do not appear to be meaningfully overvalued, reducing the risk of large land write-downs compared to London-focused peers.
The UK homebuilding industry is highly cyclical, characterized by volatile demand and a slow-adjusting supply. Christian notes that the UK’s complex and slow “planning system” creates high barriers to entry, making it difficult for smaller builders to operate. This uncertainty requires builders to maintain a large pipeline of sites, favoring scaled operators like Bellway.
This dynamic has contributed to industry consolidation and a more rational land market post-GFC, with fewer, more disciplined bidders for land.
The investment opportunity stems from a cyclical downturn in UK housing demand, driven by interest rate increases since 2022, which has depressed the stock. Christian views Bellway as one of the highest-quality, most conservatively managed builders in the UK, noting it outperformed peers during the GFC. The business possesses a strong, almost unlevered balance sheet (approx. 6% net debt to total cap) and generates positive FCF during downturns as its inventory (land and work-in-progress) is freed up.
This financial strength minimizes tail risks. The company has a long track record of compounding book value per share (plus dividends) at a 15.2% CAGR since 1994. Management recently updated its capital allocation framework to include a new £150m buyback program and a greater focus on capital returns.
Christian points out that the shares recently traded at 0.87x P/TBV, which compares favorably to its 22-year historical average multiple of 1.26x P/TBV. This suggests a 45% upside merely from a reversion to the mean. Based on an estimated 13% mid-cycle ROE, the stock trades at an inexpensive 6.7x mid-cycle earnings. Christian projects that if the stock is held for two years and exits at its historical 1.26x P/TBV multiple, the investment could generate a 35% annualized return.
A more conservative six-year hold under the same assumptions would still yield a 17% annualized return, offering an attractive risk-adjusted upside.
Topicus: The Constellation Software Playbook Hits Europe
James Emanuel of Rock & Turner presented his in-depth investment thesis on Topicus (Canada: TOI) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Topicus is a 2021 spin-off from Constellation Software (CSU) executing a programmatic acquirer playbook focused on the European market. James describes this “Acquisition-as-a-Business” (AaaB) model as one that uses permanent capital to acquire and indefinitely hold niche vertical market software (VMS) companies. This strategy differs from private equity or serial roll-ups by emphasizing extreme decentralization, which avoids integration risk and allows acquired businesses to run autonomously.
James notes this decentralized approach builds portfolio diversification and “anti-fragility” while operating like an active fund without the associated 2-and-20 fees.
The company’s primary competitive advantage, according to James, is its disciplined, in-house M&A process inherited from CSU. Topicus leverages a proprietary Salesforce database of ~100,000 potential targets, where business managers with software backgrounds—not finance professionals—nurture relationships, often for years. This patient approach generates a proprietary deal flow (at a 0.13% annual conversion rate) that allows the company to avoid competitive auctions and brokers.
James argues the European market offers a vast runway of private companies, often at lower multiples than in North America, while high barriers to entry like language, culture, and regulation deter competition.
James highlights Topicus’s superior financial characteristics, including the negative working capital profile afforded by upfront software subscriptions, which provides free financing for operations and acquisitions. He also contrasts its disciplined accounting—allocating <20% of purchase price to goodwill—with other acquirers who may use high goodwill allocations to engineer earnings.
Topicus provides transparent shareholder reporting through its “Free Cash Flow Available to Shareholders” (FCFA2S) metric, which clearly breaks out the non-controlling interest (NCI) share. The company maintains management continuity, as it is led by Robin van Poelje, who founded the core TSS business in 2006.
James observes that the pace of capital deployment has accelerated, with over €700 million deployed in 2025 alone, nearly matching the €790 million total from the 2021-2024 period. This was driven by the strategic ~€500 million “marriage” with Asseco, a Polish “Topicus twin,” which opens up Eastern European markets. James notes the shares recently experienced a 25% drawdown, which he attributes to group-level noise at CSU rather than fundamental issues at Topicus.
He argues Topicus may screen as more expensive than it is, as the benefits from 2025’s heavy M&A investments have yet to flow through, while the costs hit financials immediately. Furthermore, the FCFA2S ratio is steadily increasing as the NCI share declines, which should increase the NPV of future cash flows.
Derichebourg: Family-Owned Cyclical Opportunity with Secular Growth
Juan Huerta de Soto of Cobas Asset Management presented his investment thesis on Derichebourg (France: DBG) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Derichebourg is a French-listed leader in scrap metal recycling with #1 market positions in France (~40% share) and Spain. Juan notes this core business, representing 90% of EBITDA, possesses high barriers to entry based on regional economies of scale, a dense network that is difficult to replicate organically, and a highly regulated environment that advantages incumbents.
The company also operates a smaller, stable public sector services business (10% of EBITDA) and holds a 48.3% stake in Elior Group, a separate, publicly-traded catering company.
The thesis is supported by a family-run management team with long-term alignment; the Derichebourg family owns 41% of the company. Juan highlights the team’s operational expertise, led by Chairman Daniel Derichebourg and Deputy CEO Abderrahmane El Aoufir, who has been with the company for over 40 years. Capital allocation is focused on disciplined M&A at cycle bottoms to gain market share and the payment of dividends.
Juan argues that the inherent cyclicality of the recycling business, which is tied to macroeconomic activity for both scrap supply and end-market demand, provides the mispricing and attractive entry point. The company mitigates this volatility by increasingly focusing on higher-margin, non-ferrous “niche” businesses. The 48.3% stake in Elior, which Juan believes the market ascribes no value to, also adds a non-cyclical, asset-light business.
The recent restructuring of Elior is now complete, with margins and FCF improving, and a potential dividend from Elior could serve as a catalyst for Derichebourg.
The core recycling segment is also supported by a long-term secular growth trend, as EU regulations favor scrap metal recycling to meet energy transition and CO2 emission reduction goals. Using scrap is substantially less energy- and carbon-intensive than primary mining, with Juan noting an 86% reduction in CO2 emissions for steel produced via scrap-EAF.
The shares recently traded at a very attractive valuation. Juan calculates that after deducting the market value of the Elior stake, Derichebourg trades at approximately 2x EV/EBITDA and 4-5x P/FCF. This is a steep discount to its closest publicly traded peer, Sims (7.5x EV/EBITDA and 14x P/FCF), and the recent M&A transaction for peer Radius (8x EV/EBITDA and 12x P/FCF).
Westwing: Shareholder-Friendly Online Retailer With Margin Upside
Brad Hathaway of Far View Capital Management presented his investment thesis on Westwing Group (Germany: WEW) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Westwing is a European direct-to-consumer online home furnishings retailer operating in 22 countries. Founded in Germany in 2011, the company uses a content-led strategy to drive strong user engagement and cohort economics, with 80% of orders coming from repeat customers. It targets a premium “masstige” position with a primarily female customer base.
Westwing is exiting a multi-year transformation that unified its commercial model, reduced costs, and migrated its backend to an external SaaS platform, creating a more scalable foundation.
Brad believes an opportunity exists as the industry begins a cyclical recovery from a post-COVID downturn. This downturn improved WEW’s competitive environment, as key online competitors like Made.com have liquidated and Wayfair has exited the German market. Westwing is positioned as a survivor ready to take share in an upturn. Furthermore, the company’s progress is currently obscured in its 2025 financials.
2025 results are artificially depressed, masking the transformation’s success. The company’s upgrade to a more premium, globalized product assortment creates a temporary headwind, resulting in flat revenue guidance (FY25: -4% to +2% yoy). Simultaneously, 2025 EBITDA margins (guided 6% to 8%) are hampered by ramp-up costs from an accelerated expansion into 10 new countries.
Brad anticipates an inflection in 2026, driven by the scaling of these new markets and the continued growth of the high-margin “Westwing Collection” private label, which reached 65% of GMV in Q2 2025.
The long-tenured management team, led by CEO Andreas Hoerning and founder Delia Lachance, is long-term oriented, evidenced by multiple insider purchases. Capital allocation is a key strength. The company executed a tender offer in November 2024 — an unconventional move for a German company — and holds 9.9% of shares in Treasury. This shareholder-friendly approach is expected to continue once technical limitations on share retirement are resolved in 2026.
The shares recently traded at under €12. He sees downside protection at €9-€10, a valuation based on a 4x multiple of 2025 guided EBITDA (approx. €35M) and an 8% FCF yield, supported by a strong balance sheet with ~€50M in net cash. Conversely, Brad calculates an upside potential of ~€45 per share. This target is based on a 2028 scenario assuming a return to double-digit growth and >10% EBITDA margins, applying a 12x EBITDA multiple to ~€69M of EBITDA.
This remains below the company’s mid-term aspiration for 15% EBITDA margins.
Mayr-Melnhof: Undervalued, as Strategic Pivot Signals Inflection Point
Shaun Heelan of Maat Investment Group presented his investment thesis on Mayr-Melnhof Karton AG (Austria: MMK) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Mayr-Melnhof Karton is a dominant Austrian paper and packaging producer historically run as a conservative, low-leverage family business (58% foundation-owned). This changed in 2020 when new management, led by CEO Peter Oswald, pivoted to an aggressive growth strategy, undertaking a major capex program and M&A splurge. The company moved into virgin fiber (FBB) cartonboard and expanded its packaging division, funded by debt.
This shift coincided with “Goldilocks” COVID-era conditions, which saw demand and pricing explode, leading to peak earnings in 2022 and Mr. Oswald being named CEO of the year.
Following the 2022 peak, MMK faced a confluence of negative factors. The Ukraine war eliminated 10% of industry demand (Russia) and spiked energy costs just as the company’s hedges rolled off. Simultaneously, a massive post-COVID destocking cycle by customers reversed the demand boom. This occurred just as MMK and competitors (like Stora Enso) brought new capacity online, causing industry utilization to collapse to 40-year lows (below 70%) and MMK’s EBIT per ton to turn negative in 2023.
With leverage peaking at over 3.5x net debt/EBITDA, the market feared a dilutive rights issue, and the share price fell to an all-time low.
The market is overlooking a decisive “strategic pivot” and the cyclical nature of the industry. The family foundation stepped in late last year, forcing a volte-face: MMK is now de-emphasizing M&A and cutting capex to maintenance levels. The company is actively deleveraging, proven by the sale of its TANN assets for ~€494m (nearly double their 2018 purchase price). Shaun argues the capacity issue is temporary, with utilization already recovering to over 80% and competitors shutting down inefficient plants.
He notes MMK has a moat in its “grandfathered” recycled plants, which are protected by NIMBY issues. As a strong signal of a trough, the company initiated its third-ever share buyback (up to 5%, capped at €80), and Shaun expects a substantial dividend increase as leverage falls below 2.0x.
Shaun believes the company is substantially undervalued, with a normalized EV of €4.4bn to €6.2bn, compared to its recent EV of €2.7bn. The valuation is supported by a sum-of-the-parts analysis, valuing the cartonboard assets at €1.4bn-€2.0bn and the packaging division at €3.0bn-€4.2bn. This packaging valuation is validated by the recent TANN asset sale at 11.2x EBITDA, a stark contrast to the entire group’s recent multiple of <6x TTM EBITDA.
On a normalized basis, Shaun estimates MMK trades at 4.5x EV/EBITDA. He sees a base case price of €118 (at 6x 2028E EBITDA) and a bull case of €160 (at 8x), with downside protection from the 58% family ownership (no take-under risk) and the new buyback program.
Norma: Mispriced Auto Supplier with Major Capital Return Kicker
Nils Herzing of Shareholder Value Beteiligungen AG presented his investment thesis on Norma Group SE (Germany: NOEJ) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Norma Group is a German producer of mission-critical C-components, such as clamps and fasteners, for automotive and industrial applications. The company is widely perceived as an automotive supplier, a sector facing cyclical and structural headwinds. The core of the investment thesis is a valuation dislocation driven by the pending sale of its highly profitable NDS water management division.
This divestiture, which was pushed by activist shareholder Teleios (21% owner) and is expected to close by early 2026, provides a large cash infusion and a clear catalyst for the re-rating of the remaining business.
The “new” Norma, post-divestiture, will consist of the Mobility and Industry Applications segments. The market is concerned about the Mobility segment’s exposure to the ICE-to-BEV transition, but Nils’s research indicates that BEV content per vehicle (CPV) is 50-90% that of an ICE vehicle, mitigating this risk. Current profitability is depressed, with the Mobility segment recently operating at a 2% EBITA margin.
Nils argues this is temporary, resulting from one-off costs related to plant rationalization (extra freight, temporary labor) and legacy OEM contracts. The company is now implementing a “margin-before-volume” policy on new contracts, targeting >10% EBIT margins, while the Industry Applications segment already achieves >10% margins.
The NDS sale is expected to generate proceeds of 840 million EUR ($1 billion USD). This cash influx is the thesis’s primary driver. Management plans to first repay all outstanding debt. Following this, a massive capital return is planned, starting with a 10% share buyback. A subsequent special tender, which requires an AGM vote, will aim to repurchase at least an additional 30% of shares outstanding.
Nils highlights this will reduce the total share count by a minimum of 40%, driving significant EPS accretion, alongside an expected dividend. A smaller portion of the proceeds is earmarked for M&A in the industrial fastener space.
The stock recently traded around 15.00 EUR. Nils views this as highly compelling, noting the market cap of ~450 million EUR is backed by >300 million EUR in cash that the company will hold post-debt-repayment but pre-buybacks, illustrating a protected downside. Nils presented a SOTP valuation that arrives at a fair value of 23.80 EUR per share. This SOTP values the remaining Mobility business at 6.0x EV/EBIT and the Industry business at 8.0x EV/EBIT, combined with the net proceeds from the NDS sale.
Based on a conservative margin recovery path (to 8% EBITA by 2030) and the large-scale repurchases, Nils projects a 22% TSR.
Barratt: Well-Run UK Homebuilder at Discount to Liquidation Value
Simon Caufield of SIM Limited presented his investment thesis on Barratt Redrow plc (UK: BTRW) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Barratt Redrow is the UK’s largest housebuilder, operating under three distinct brands: Barratt, David Wilson, and Redrow, which target first-time buyers, the mid-market, and the premium market, respectively. Simon highlights the company’s operational strengths, stemming from its scale and investment in off-site factory production for components like timber frames and bathroom pods. This approach enhances efficiency and lowers construction costs.
The multi-brand strategy facilitates a wider customer appeal and a faster sales rate, which makes larger development sites viable for the company.
Simon emphasizes the conservative, cost-conscious culture, which is led by a CEO who was the former CFO. This culture prioritizes efficiency and ROI. A key operational differentiator for Barratt Redrow is its centralized land-buying process. Unlike peers who may allow regional divisions to make purchases, all land acquisition at Barratt is signed off by the CEO or CFO. Simon believes this centralized control prevents the company from overpaying for land, a common pitfall in the industry.
The core of Simon’s thesis rests on a market misunderstanding of UK housing shocks. The consensus view is that UK houses are unaffordable and that falling prices and volumes will lead to a drop in homebuilder earnings. Simon argues this view is both wrong and irrelevant. He believes it is “wrong” because the UK has a structural housing shortage and demand is typically deferred rather than destroyed.
He argues it is “irrelevant” because of the industry’s unique operating model, which the market fails to appreciate.
Simon explains that UK builders hold 3-4 years of land as inventory. During a downturn, as volumes fall, they stop buying new land. This action causes OCF to increase as working capital is released. Simultaneously, land prices fall at a much faster rate than house prices. The company can then restart buying land at depressed prices, which feeds through to higher margins 3-4 years later.
Simon notes that the 2022-2025 period saw a shock equivalent to 83% of the GFC, creating the same setup that led to a sharp recovery in earnings and the stock price after 2011. He believes sell-side analysts have missed this and that earnings upgrades are forthcoming.
Simon notes that the shares recently traded at a 10-year low, down over 50% from their 2020 high. He estimates a liquidation value of £12 billion, which is more than twice the recent market cap of £5.7 billion. This suggests the stock trades at approximately 47% of its liquidation value.
This valuation is derived from building out the existing owned and optioned land bank, plus strategic plots already in local authority plans, and conservatively excludes the value of 224,000 other strategic plots and the brand itself.
Unidata: Founder-Led Italian Fiber Company at Key Inflection Point
Alejandro Estebaranz of True Value presented his investment thesis on Unidata (Italy: UD) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Unidata is a founder-led Italian digital infrastructure provider with a diversified portfolio of services including connectivity, cloud, and IoT solutions, underpinned by a proprietary network of over 7,000 km of fiber and two data centers. The company is positioned to capitalize on Italy’s structural need to expand its fiber network, which currently lags European peers, while benefiting from fiber’s technological superiority over competing 5G and satellite technologies.
With a strong history of revenue growth, stable margins, and high insider ownership exceeding 55%, Unidata presents a compelling profile of a well-managed, aligned, and strategically positioned operator.
The core of the investment thesis rests on a significant inflection point expected within the next two years, driven by the completion and value crystallization of three strategic, late-stage joint ventures. These include Unifiber, a Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) project in the Lazio region; Unitirreno, a new low-latency submarine cable connecting Italy to Northern Europe; and Unicenter, a Tier IV data center in Rome designed for AI workloads and serving as the cable’s landing station.
These de-risked projects, developed with credible partners, are all scheduled to become operational by 2025, transitioning the company from a period of heavy investment to one of significant cash flow generation and rapid deleveraging.
The company’s financial trajectory is robust, with projections indicating a revenue CAGR of 12% and an EBITDA CAGR of 15% between 2024 and 2027, while maintaining stable EBITDA margins in the 27-28% range. As capital expenditures normalize post-2025, Unidata is forecast to deleverage, with its net debt-to-EBITDA ratio expected to fall from 1.7x in 2024 to 0.4x by 2027.
This financial discipline is projected to generate substantial FCF, with an implied FCF yield exceeding 20% in 2026, offering capacity for shareholder returns or further strategic investments.
Unidata’s shares recently traded at a deep discount to their intrinsic value, creating an arbitrage opportunity between public and private market valuations for digital infrastructure assets. The company’s 2025 estimated EV/EBITDA multiple of 4.5x stands in contrast to the 18-20x multiples seen in M&A for comparable FTTH assets and the 10-13x multiples for corporate peers like Retelit and EOLO.
This valuation disconnect is the basis for a target price of €6.60 per share, which implies an upside of over 100% from recent levels. As the strategic joint ventures become operational and their value becomes undeniable, a re-rating of the stock is anticipated, closing the gap to its private market value.
Kuehne+Nagel: High-ROIC Logistics Leader Temporarily Disrupted
Adam Crocker of Logbook Investments presented his investment thesis on Kuehne+Nagel International AG (Switzerland: KNIN) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Kuehne+Nagel is a global, asset-light freight forwarder founded in 1890. The company buys wholesale capacity from sea, air, and ground carriers and resells it to shippers, a model Adam likens to a “travel agent for goods.” It also operates a third-party logistics (3PL) division, Contract Logistics, providing outsourced supply chain functions for manufacturers. The business is an essential service, characterized by deep networks, scale, and high returns on capital.
It is consistently recognized by Gartner as a “Leader” in the industry, alongside peers like DHL and DSV.
Adam’s thesis posits that Kuehne+Nagel is a high-quality, historically predictable business that is temporarily mispriced due to recent events. Post-COVID macroeconomic volatility disrupted its predictable performance. Furthermore, management “dented credibility” by setting overly ambitious 2026 targets at its 2023 investor day, only to cut them in March 2025. This loss of predictability, a trait highly valued by its investor base, has created an opportunity.
Adam argues this is a “reversion to mean valuation story,” as the underlying fundamentals of the business remain intact.
The company is not standing still and is implementing initiatives to drive growth and efficiency. It has restructured its go-to-market strategy, moving from a geographic focus to a matrix based on customer size (global, national, and SME). A key focus is growing its share of the more profitable SME segment, which generates 1.8x the gross profit of non-SME accounts, by leveraging automation and new digital platforms like “eTouch.” The company maintains a high dividend payout, targeting over 80% of earnings.
Adam notes this capital allocation policy, which contrasts with DSV’s M&A-focused strategy, is largely driven by the controlling shareholder.
The firm is 55% controlled by Klaus-Michael Kuehne, the founder’s grandson, who no longer holds an active role. His shares are set to be bequeathed to a foundation, which ensures a long-term strategic focus but largely precludes an acquisition. Adam identifies “real risks” as a macro slowdown, competitor consolidation, carriers like Maersk entering freight forwarding, and new tech-based competitors like Flexport.
He views “perceived risks,” such as nearshoring (which he sees as a “plus one” strategy) and the recent poor forecasting, as the source of the current opportunity.
Regarding valuation, the shares recently traded at an LTM EV/EBIT of 13.2x and an EV/EBITDA of 8.2x. This is a discount to the company’s historical 10-year median EV/EBIT multiple of 18.2x. The investment thesis rests on this multiple re-rating as the business returns to its predictable cadence. The stock also trades at a discount to its closest peer, DSV, which recently traded at 21.8x EV/EBIT, and at valuations below recent industry M&A transactions.
Adam’s base case scenario, which assumes modest 3% revenue growth and a 16.0x EV/EBIT multiple, implies 32% upside from recent levels.
Volkswagen: Deep Restructuring Unlocks Value at Leading Automaker
Stuart Mitchell of S. W. Mitchell Capital presented his investment thesis on Volkswagen (Germany: VOW, VOW3) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Volkswagen is a controversial, deep-value cyclical investment. VW is the world’s second-largest car manufacturer with a 9% market share and the leading manufacturer in Europe with a 23% share. The group’s brand portfolio spans from mass-market Skoda (8% operating margin) to luxury Porsche (15% operating margin). Stuart notes that a long-standing challenge has been the core VW auto brand, which, despite its volume, earns only a 2% operating margin.
The investment thesis rests on management addressing three main challenges that have caused the share price to fall to the low 90s. The first challenge is China, where VW has a 20% share in internal combustion engines (ICE) but only 4% in battery electric vehicles (BEVs). Stuart argues that VW is responding effectively by introducing the ‘China Main Platform’ to cut production costs by 40% and creating the Volkswagen China Technology Company to develop software localized for Chinese consumers.
A joint venture with XPENG will also provide a low-cost platform for Audi.
The second challenge is European profitability. Stuart points to a deep restructuring plan (‘Zukunft Volkswagen’) agreed upon in December 2024. This plan includes cutting 35,000 German jobs (25% of German capacity), reducing Wolfsburg capacity from four lines to two, and suspending a 5% wage increase until 2030. This contributes to a total cost-saving target of €15 billion.
The third challenge, technology, Stuart believes is “more imagined than real,” arguing VW’s pragmatic “make and buy” approach, including JVs with Rivian and XPENG, is narrowing any perceived gap.
Stuart presents a sum-of-the-parts (SOTP) valuation to highlight the disconnect, with the stock recently trading near €92. A conservative SOTP analysis values the high-end Porsche models (911, Panamera) at 10x EV/EBIT and the mid-level luxury brands (Audi, Lamborghini, and the rest of Porsche) at 4x EV/EBIT. This SOTP, which also includes the truck and financial services divisions, plus €40 billion in industrial net cash, less pensions and minorities, results in a value per share of €313.
Stuart notes this 10x multiple for Porsche is a fraction of Ferrari’s. If the restructuring is executed, he also projects the business could trade on 1.5x 2027 earnings.
Edenred: Durable Growth Obscured by Regulatory Uncertainty
Jean-Pascal Rolandez of The L.T. Funds presented his investment thesis on Edenred (France: EDEN) at European Investing Summit 2025.
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Thesis summary:
Edenred is a world leader in specific use payment solutions. The company originated the restaurant voucher in France and operates on a commission-based model, charging both client issuers and merchant partners. After being spun off from Accor in 2010 , Edenred expanded to become the sector leader , operating in 45 countries with a network of over 1 million client issuers, 2 million merchant partners, and 60 million users.
The company has diversified beyond vouchers into management services and controlled payments.
The investment thesis highlights a strong business model, a global network , and a management team described as very good, financially minded, and excellent at execution. The company has a strong post-Covid track record, showing +21% sales p.a. and +25% EBIT. While originating in France, the country now represents only 12% of OP. The business demonstrates high cash flow generation, with FCF estimated at approximately 30% of sales.
The opportunity exists because the company is viewed as a “fallen star” due to current regulatory uncertainty. This regulatory risk is present in all countries , with three main countries specifically under review. Other threats include potential new reforms, unfavorable litigation judgments, and fines from competition authorities. Weaknesses noted include high tax rates (31-32%) , exposure to Latin America (29% of EBIT) , and the presence of goodwill and negative equity.
The presentation suggested the valuation was attractive due to this regulatory overhang. It was noted that Capital group had taken a 10% stake, alongside seven other US investors holding 5%. Based on 2026 estimates, the shares recently traded at an EV/EBITDA of 4.1x. The thesis projects a durable high single-digit growth rate , and at the time of the presentation, the gross dividend yield was 5.8%.
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