Latticework by MOI Global: In-depth investment ideas

4imprint: North American Market Leader Hidden on the LSE

MOI Global Equity Research — Fri, 17 Jul 2026 20:01:58 GMT

Jim and Abigail Zimmerman of Lowell Capital Management presented their thesis on 4imprint Group (UK: FOUR) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

4imprint is the largest direct marketer and distributor of promotional products in North America. Founded in 1987 and headquartered in London, it generates ~98% of revenue in the US and Canada yet trades on the London Stock Exchange. It supplies customized apparel, drinkware, bags, and writing instruments to small and medium-sized businesses, holding about 5% of a fragmented $20+ billion industry where no competitor approaches its scale.

The model is asset-light. Under its drop-ship model, suppliers hold inventory and ship directly to customers, holding capex to 1-2% of sales and producing ROACE above 40%. Jim and Abby call FOUR the “Amazon of promotional products,” sitting between customer and supplier and selling certainty and service. Marketing is the primary growth investment: FOUR spends $150-175 million per year and earns $6-9 of revenue per marketing dollar, a budget exceeding most competitors’ revenue and funding the “4imprint for Certain” brand and flywheel.

Revenue grew from about $787 million to $1.35 billion over five years, roughly 60% since 2019, outpacing 3-5% industry growth as FOUR took and retained share. Gross margin expanded from 28% to 32% and has held through inflation and tariffs. Existing customers account for 70-75% of annual orders. The balance sheet carries no debt and $133 million of net cash, and FOUR has returned more than $100 million per year to shareholders over three years through ordinary and special dividends and buybacks.

The opportunity exists because UK small caps trade at discounts to US peers, the LSE listing limits US awareness of a North American business, and 2026 tariff-related supplier cost increases drove the shares down; management calls that impact manageable. The forward dividend is 4.8%, with special dividends lifting the loaded yield toward 7-8%.

The shares recently traded near $50, about 8.5x EBITDA and 10x cash flow. Jim and Abby model 5% revenue CAGR to more than $1.7 billion, supporting roughly $190 million of EBITDA. A re-rating to 12x EBITDA plus net cash implies equity value near $2.4 billion, or about $90 per share. They also see FOUR as a possible acquisition candidate for a strategic or financial buyer.

Disclaimer

Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2026 was held from June 23-26, 2026. The content of this website is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security. The content is distributed for informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment advice or a recommendation to sell or buy any security or other investment, or undertake any investment strategy. There are no warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or results obtained from any information set forth on this website. BeyondProxy’s officers, directors, employees, and/or contributing authors may have positions in and may, from time to time, make purchases or sales of the securities or other investments discussed or evaluated herein.

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Midea: Industrial Compounder Priced as Home Appliance Maker

MOI Global Equity Research — Fri, 17 Jul 2026 20:01:47 GMT

Rodrigo Lopez Buenrostro of KUE Capital presented his thesis on Midea Group (HK: 0300; China: 000333) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Midea is a vertically integrated, global original brand manufacturer (OBM). The market prices it as a saturated home appliance maker; Rodrigo argues it is an underpriced global industrial compounder. In FY2025 Midea generated RMB 458.5B (US$63.5B) of revenue, up 12%, and RMB 44.0B (US$6.1B) of net profit, up 14%, on a 27% gross margin. Non-China revenue is 43% of the total and grew 16%, across 65 production centers and 200-plus countries.

Two engines drive the business: a B2C smart home franchise at 66% of revenue that funds the company, and a B2B commercial and industrial platform at 27% that should drive a re-rating. The moat rests on vertical integration and manufacturing depth. Through its GMCC unit, Midea holds 45% of the global HVAC compressor market, the highest-value part of an air conditioner, plus 40% of AC motors. It ranks fourth worldwide in patent families and owns KUKA, a top-four robotics platform.

Rodrigo’s differentiated view is that B2B re-rates the stock as it crosses 30% of the revenue mix from 27% today, with B2B gross margins moving above 25%. He models B2B compounding at 15% and B2C at a conservative 6%, with overseas appliances and B2B leading growth as China’s subsidy-driven domestic market normalizes. Historical ROE has averaged 20% on 13% ROIC; he forecasts 22% ROE and 17% ROIC, funded internally by a net-cash balance sheet.

Management is aligned with minorities. The He founding family and insiders own about 34% of the company, and 83% of CEO Fang Hongbo’s pay is equity that vests only if ROE stays above 18%. Fang, 33 years at Midea, led the 2025 acquisitions of Toshiba Elevator China, Arbonia, and Carestream, listed the H-shares in 2024 to attract foreign capital, and raised the dividend 47%, taking the yield to about 5%.

Midea recently traded at 79 CNY (US$11.5), or 15x earnings and a 7.3% FCFE yield, against Rodrigo’s intrinsic value of 130 CNY (US$19), a 38% margin of safety and a 21% IRR to 2033, roughly 5 points of it from dividends. His exit assumptions are modest: a 17x P/E, a 6% FCFE yield, and a 19% terminal ROE, on forward revenue and FCFE CAGRs of 9% and 12%. The shares trade near half the multiple of Western HVAC and elevator peers such as Otis, Carrier, and Honeywell, despite comparable or higher ROIC.

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Axon: The Public Safety Operating System Where AI Widens the Moat

MOI Global Equity Research — Fri, 17 Jul 2026 19:55:13 GMT

Matthew Castel of Logos LP presented his investment thesis on Axon Enterprise (US: AXON) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Axon Enterprise is a leader in public safety technology, founder-led since 1993, that has grown from a TASER maker into what Matthew calls the operating system for public safety. Each layer built on the last: TASERs led to body cameras, which created a data problem solved by Evidence.com, now the largest police evidence repository and Microsoft Azure’s largest customer, holding ~50x the content of the Netflix library. Acquisitions including Fusus and Dedrone added real-time crime centers and counter-drone capability. Matthew frames Axon as a business whose moat AI strengthens rather than erodes, since its AI is fed by data only its own hardware can generate.

The moat rests on workflow embeddedness, with Axon spanning the chain from officer to evidence to AI-drafted report to prosecutor, so removing it becomes an institutional change rather than a software swap. Switching costs appear in multi-year contracts, 95%+ recurring revenue, and 125% NRR. CJIS compliance takes years to obtain and bars casual entrants, while the AI ethics board aids procurement wins. Axon leads across body cameras and evidence, AI reporting, drone and counter-drone, and dispatch, whereas rivals such as Motorola and Palantir hold single categories.

Axon has posted roughly nine consecutive quarters of 30%+ revenue growth. ARR is growing 35%, NRR is 125%, and future contracted bookings reached $14.3B, up 44%. Estimates imply revenue roughly doubling from FY25 to FY28. Draft One has cut officer report time from about 50% to 20% of the working day, funded within existing subscriptions rather than new budget.

Matthew points to three underpenetrated vectors. International is about 20% of revenue and grew over 100%, with management targeting parity with the US. Enterprise grew about 50%, spanning data centers, retail, and hospitals. Drone and counter-drone grew over 300%, and Dedrone has already booked more than Axon paid for it.

On valuation, the shares recently traded near $440, about 50x forward 2026 earnings. Matthew’s base case is $735, at 13x FY27E sales for 67% upside, against an upside case of $945 and a downside of $350. Adjusted EPS rising from $7.14 in FY25 to an estimated $16.14 in FY28 implies a 31% CAGR and a 29x FY28 P/E. He views Axon as a premium compounder rather than a value trap, with SBC near 17% of revenue and growth deceleration the main risks to FCF and the multiple.

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Salesforce: Why Distribution, Not Software, Is the Durable Moat

MOI Global Equity Research — Thu, 09 Jul 2026 11:53:09 GMT

Andrew Macken of Montaka Global Investments presented his investment thesis on Salesforce (NYSE: CRM) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Salesforce is the leader in cloud-based CRM software, 4-5x larger than the number-two player, housing the data, metadata, and workflows of more than 150,000 corporate customers. It owns Slack and embeds agentic AI under its Agentforce brand. Andrew argues the market has misread the company amid the “SaaSpocalypse” narrative: that agentic AI lets software be copied or in-sourced cheaply, killing seat-based SaaS and handing power to foundation model companies. On that fear, CRM shares have halved.

Salesforce wins as a privileged distributor of third-party intelligence, not as a creator of code. Deploying agents safely inside an enterprise is harder than it looks, raising governance, security, and control questions that take years to resolve. Salesforce already holds trusted, secure distribution into those enterprises, through which agentic capabilities flow into existing workflows, now even via “headless” access from outside interfaces. Its hard-to-replicate assets are data (over 250 petabytes of proprietary customer data and metadata), distribution, and scale (over $6 billion in annual R&D).

On tokenomics, agentic use cases are hundreds of times more compute-intensive than chatbots, while supply-constrained US power prices are up >30% since 2020. Customers are scrutinizing token budgets and substituting frontier models with cheaper open-weight alternatives. The AI model layer is substitutable; Salesforce’s distribution, workflows, and data are not.

Field interviews point to ROIs of 5x to 20x from labor substitution, with Agentic Work Units up 111% QoQ and token consumption up more than 150% QoQ. Reported revenue growth has lagged because deployment takes time and early Agentforce discounts, including a US bank with consumption pricing waived until 2027, are only now rolling off. Andrew expects low-growth seat licenses offset by agent-consumption growth and operating leverage on the $15 billion marketing budget, lifting earnings above 20% p.a. with near-zero capital intensity.

At an EV near $160 billion, CRM recently traded at ~4.5x EV to gross profit and ~3x EV to the gross profit of its signed $70 billion backlog, levels implying about 1% perpetual revenue growth or no going concern. Against management’s FY30 guidance of $63+ billion in revenue and estimated EBITA above $20 billion, the shares recently traded below 8x EV/FY30 EBITA. The board has authorized a $50 billion buyback. Andrew expects a re-rating if Salesforce proves to be a key distributor of intelligence.

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Canal+: African Growth Hidden in Undervalued European Spinoff

MOI Global Equity Research — Tue, 07 Jul 2026 19:32:12 GMT

Julio Utrera of Southeastern Asset Management presented his thesis on Canal+ (UK: CAN; South Africa: CNP) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Canal+ is a global pay-TV and streaming super-aggregator that produces, distributes, and aggregates content and sports rights under long-duration subscription contracts. Julio sees a scaled, moated business mispriced for the complexity of its December 2024 Vivendi spinoff, a pound-denominated London listing for a euro reporter, and a Bolloré overhang. The shares fell over 20% on debut and have stayed there. After the December 2025 MultiChoice acquisition, Canal+ carries about 42m subscribers, a top-seven global video platform, with a 60% pay-TV share in France.

The case turns on two engines inflecting together. Africa is the primary driver: MultiChoice extends francophone leadership across 19 Sub-Saharan countries into English- and Portuguese-speaking markets, leaving the combined group with over 25% of continental pay-TV share, more than twice its nearest rival. Julio argues the region sits 20 years behind Europe, where low broadband, costly mobile data, and satellite economics favor Canal+’s decoder model, while 800m of population growth by 2050 and rising electrification widen the base. Management guides to over €400m of annual synergies by 2030, €250m already in FY2026.

The second engine is the rationalized European core. France, long treated as a drag, reached break-even this year after recovering from 4.5m subscribers in 2019 to 5.7m in 2025, with OTT now a quarter of the base, and Julio expects margins to converge toward European norms. He adds roughly €1bn of non-core value across StudioCanal, Dailymotion, GVA, and several minority stakes.

Management alignment is tight. CEO Maxime Saada’s incentive plan pays only above £5.2 per share, near double the recent price, and the board has bought stock personally, with Saada holding about €5m. Bolloré, the largest holder above 31% through Compagnie de L’Odet, keeps adding shares and has a record of crystallizing value, as with the 2021 UMG spinoff. Recent quarters cleared the MultiChoice close, the French VAT dispute, and UEFA renewals at better terms.

On price, the shares recently traded at about £2.5 to £2.6, for a €3bn market cap, against roughly 4x 2027 EV/EBITDA and a teens FCF yield. Julio notes the €2.5bn paid for MultiChoice alone approaches the group’s market value. His SOTP, valuing Africa at low-double-digit multiples and Europe lower, yields €5bn to €8bn of equity, or €5.6 per share centrally (£4.9) and up to €8.6 (£7.5). Management targets €500m of group FCF by 2028, about €0.50 per share, implying 75% to over 100% upside.

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Canal+ Presentation

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UnitedHealth Group: Cyclical Fears Mask a Structurally Widening Moat

MOI Global Equity Research — Wed, 01 Jul 2026 08:20:48 GMT

Dave Sather of Sather Financial Group presented his investment thesis on UnitedHealth Group (US: UNH) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

UnitedHealth Group is the largest health insurer in the United States and one of the “most hated” companies in the country. It comprises two parts: UnitedHealthcare, which underwrites risk and insures roughly 50.9 million members, ahead of Elevance at 45.2 million; and Optum, which owns clinics, physicians, data, and pharmacy infrastructure. Optum Health employs or contracts about 90,000 physicians, roughly 10% of the US workforce; Optum Insight holds the largest de-identified clinical and claims database, covering about 330 million people, 9 of 10 hospitals, and 4 of 5 health plans; and Optum Rx is the third-largest PBM at about 23% share. Dave frames the combination as a flywheel: Optum’s data sharpens UnitedHealthcare’s underwriting, and the same tools are sold to other participants.

The moat rests on scale and predictive data, evidenced by a best-in-class MLR averaging 82.8% over the past decade. Dave notes the moat was tested when Haven, the 2018 Amazon, Berkshire, and JPMorgan JV, tried to displace managed care and disbanded by 2021. Todd Combs, its driving force, later bought UNH stock for Berkshire. Dave views Morningstar’s narrow-moat rating as misplaced.

The shares recently traded near where they sat five years ago, weighed down by the Change Healthcare cyberattack, the CEO murder, a DOJ billing probe, Medicare Advantage rate fears, and PBM reform. Dave argues these are largely cyclical or overstated. A late-2025 Humana ruling barring sample extrapolation undercuts the $26 billion liability figure, and the 2027 MA final rate came in better than feared. The core issue, elevated post-COVID utilization, is short-tail and reprices every 12 months.

Returning CEO Stephen Hemsley, the architect of modern UNH, is repricing the book, exiting international and unprofitable accounts, shrinking enrollment, and pushing an AI-first agenda funded by $1.5 billion in 2026 at an expected 2:1 return. His pay is almost entirely stock options with three-year cliff vesting, and he has replaced 50 of the top 100 leaders.

Dave’s earnings-based two-stage DCF, using a 16x exit P/E, an 11.5% discount rate, an MLR improving to 85% by 2028, and roughly 12% EPS CAGR, supports about $460 against a recent quote near $409. EPS recently ran about $16.29 while FCF exceeded $21 per share. Management’s 13% to 16% EPS targets imply a $482 to $600 range. Dave sees about 10% downside against about 50% upside.

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Dave Sather on UnitedHealth Group

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Toast: Founder-Led AI Beneficiary With First-Ever Buyback

MOI Global Equity Research — Tue, 30 Jun 2026 14:30:12 GMT

Chris Crawford of Crawford Fund Management presented his investment thesis on Toast (NYSE: TOST) at Wide-Moat Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Toast is the leading integrated operating and payment system for restaurants, and Chris frames it as a rare combination of growth, moat, and value. The company blends purpose-built hardware, cloud software, embedded AI, and a lending arm (Toast Capital) into one system that touches every restaurant function: order management, kitchen workflow, payments, scheduling, inventory, marketing, and financial reporting. Two MIT classmates, Aman Narang and Steve Fredette, founded the business in 2011 and still run it.

Over the past several years TOST has grown sales tenfold, from about $700 million to $7+ billion, with gross profit compounding at a 72% CAGR. EBITDA and FCF both inflected positive over the past 18 months. Payments are two-thirds of revenue and the higher-margin SaaS platform one-third. Toast holds ~15% of a fragmented US market, ahead of cloud rivals Clover and Square and taking share from legacy donors Micros and Aloha.

Chris locates the moat in switching costs, the largest factor, reinforced by proprietary data and network effects, purpose-built hardware suited to a harsh restaurant environment, and a strengthening brand. Once Toast is embedded across menus, suppliers, payments, and staff training, displacing it is hard. Growth should come from new-market penetration, international and retail expansion, higher module uptake per customer, AI adoption, and mix shift toward the SaaS platform. The TAM spans roughly 1.1 million restaurants in current markets and 15 million globally ex-China.

The founders own about 9% (~$1.3 billion) and draw modest pay. The balance sheet holds $1.7 billion of net cash and no debt, which funded a first-ever buyback in Q1 at roughly a 6% annual run rate. ValueAct raised its stake, and TOST is set to join the S&P 400. Chris views AI as a tailwind rather than a disintermediation threat; other watch items are macro and consumer softness, restaurant failure rates, and interchange economics.

On valuation, the shares recently traded near $26 against Chris’s $48 blended appraisal, roughly 80% upside. His three DCF scenarios, all discounted at 10% with risk carried in the operating assumptions, span a $24 bear case, a $45 base case that already assumes growth fading to 5%, and a $64 upside case. At 2.1x EV/revenue, TOST sits near its post-IPO low; a 3.2x historical average implies $42 and a 3.75x peer multiple implies $49. No credit is given for buyback accretion.

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Oro: Founder-Led, Undervalued Japanese ERP Software Leader With Catalysts for Re-Rating

MOI Global Equity Research — Fri, 22 May 2026 17:51:51 GMT

Jiro Yasu of Varecs Partners, a Tokyo-based value investor with a market-beating record and AUM of ~US$700 million, presented his investment thesis on Oro Co (Japan: 3983) at Asian Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Oro is a Tokyo-listed software company whose high-quality Cloud Solutions ERP franchise is obscured by a struggling Marketing Solutions segment, a cash-heavy balance sheet, and a resulting conglomerate discount.

Jiro sees an opportunity to own a founder-led Japanese compounder at a bargain price, with catalysts tied to a potential Marketing Solutions divestiture and further capital-allocation improvement. Founders Atsushi Kawata (CEO, 37.67% ownership) and Yasuhisa Hino (17.02% ownership) started the company in 1999 and, per Jiro, engage openly on shareholder-return and portfolio-optimization topics.

Cloud Solutions, which serves project-based businesses such as IT services, system development, advertising, and consulting, contributes 68% of revenue and 94% of operating profit at segment OPM above 40%. FY2025 segment revenue was 5.6B yen and operating profit 2.5B yen, with 10-year revenue and profit CAGRs of 14.9% and 20.8%. Growth is being driven by new customer additions of 80–90 per year against a base of 1,100 clients, rising licenses per client, NRR of 116%, churn of 0.3%, and the January 2023 shift to SaaS-only contracts, which Jiro expects to support further margin expansion. Management targets 4,000 clients against an estimated 44,000 domestic targets.
Marketing Solutions, concentrated on Nissan and Aeon, generated 2.6B yen of revenue but only 0.1B yen of operating profit in FY2025, with a 10-year profit CAGR of negative 5.6%. Jiro believes a sale for 2–3B yen is plausible, removing a visible drag and allowing the market to reprice the Cloud franchise on its own.

Capital allocation has inflected. Net cash has grown from 1B to 10B yen, or 70% of total assets. Buybacks have stepped up from 500M yen in 2024 to 1B yen in 2025 and another 1B yen announced for 2026, with payout exceeding 40% and a 2.5% dividend yield. Jiro believes Oro should distribute more than 100% of profit going forward given the modest capital needs of the business.

Oro recently traded at 6.7x EV/EBITDA and 15.7x P/E, or roughly 10x ex-cash, a discount to Japanese software peers trading at a median 13.5x EV/EBITDA and 23.4x P/E. VARECS’ three-year base case assumes a 7.6x EV/EBIT multiple on FY2028E EBIT of 4.6B yen and a 10% share-count reduction, yielding ~66% upside from a recent 1,900 yen. A spin-off plus multiple expansion to 10x implies 104% upside; combined with a 25% buyback, upside reaches 145%.

Disclaimer

Asian Investing Summit 2026 was held from April 14-21, 2026. The content of this website is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security. The content is distributed for informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment advice or a recommendation to sell or buy any security or other investment, or undertake any investment strategy. There are no warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or results obtained from any information set forth on this website. BeyondProxy’s officers, directors, employees, and/or contributing authors may have positions in and may, from time to time, make purchases or sales of the securities or other investments discussed or evaluated herein.

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Lycopodium: Mispriced Compounder With Founder Alignment and High ROE

MOI Global Equity Research — Wed, 20 May 2026 20:03:49 GMT

Kimi Venkataraman and Sidd Thomas of India Intrinsic Value Consultants presented their investment thesis on Lycopodium Ltd (Australia: LYL) at Asian Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Lycopodium is a Perth-based engineering and project delivery services firm serving the resources sector, founded in 1992 and listed on the ASX in 2004. Sidd and Kimi describe a 30-plus-year-old business that derives roughly 94% of revenue from miners in gold, copper, lithium, rare earths, uranium, titanium and mineral sands, with no equity raises since listing. The three founders — Rodney Leonard, Michael Caratti and CEO Peter De Leo — remain involved and collectively own about 30% of the equity, aligning management with outside shareholders. Market cap recently stood at about A$530 million (about US$365 million) at a share price of A$13.30.

The core of the thesis rests on Lycopodium’s predominantly EPCM (engineering, procurement and construction management) model, which Sidd and Kimi contrast with the lump-sum EPC model that dominates listed peers. In EPCM, the owner bears cost-overrun risk while Lycopodium earns a cost-plus professional services fee, making the business capital-light, free of balance-sheet exposure, and capable of generating 30%-plus ROE (FY25). Today roughly 80%-plus of revenue sits in EPCM, with the EPC-heavier exposure largely ring-fenced via a 40/60 JV with Monadelphous. Kimi emphasizes a “study-to-EPCM flywheel”: the firm runs 40-plus scoping, PFS, FS and DFS studies at any point, and miners who use Lycopodium for feasibility almost always award it the EPCM, which in turn feeds recurring optimization work. Committed contracts stood at A$415 million with a A$1.3 billion opportunity pipeline as of December 2025.

Competitive strengths include on-time, at-budget delivery track record, two-thirds of revenue from repeat clients, a client list that includes Newmont, Rio Tinto and Anglo American Platinum, and 30-plus years of metallurgical and process data that is not replicable by new entrants. About 57% of FY25 revenue came from Africa, an area of relative strength given few established peers. In 2024, Lycopodium entered the Americas through its acquisition of Argentine firm SAXUM, which management estimates expands its TAM by about 40%. Tailwinds include high gold prices (six-plus active gold EPCM projects), a looming copper deficit driven by the energy transition, and battery-mineral demand (lithium, nickel, graphite, rare earths). The principal risk, as highlighted by the 2013-2017 commodity downturn and reinforced by Kimi, is a mining capex cycle that compresses miners’ access to financing, which historically forced Lycopodium to take on EPC risk and produced its only loss year (FY15).

Revenue grew from A$162 million in FY21 to A$340 million in FY25 (about 20% CAGR), while NPAT grew from A$14 million to A$42 million (about 31% CAGR), with net income margins expanding from 8.8% to peaks of 14.5% before softening to 12.4% in FY25. The balance sheet carries A$79 million of net cash and zero debt. The payout ratio averaged in the high 60s until FY25, when management cut payout to 33% to fund SAXUM — an unusual attribute of a business that has compounded earnings while distributing two-thirds of profits. Over the 20 years since listing, revenue compounded at 8.2%, net income at 10.8%, dividends at 11.3%, and total shareholder return (including dividends reinvested) at 14.9% CAGR.

Kimi and Sidd frame valuation by projecting the past 20-year track record forward 20 years. Starting from a current market cap of A$531 million, they estimate cumulative dividends reinvested at 3% of A$1,795 million, terminal NPAT of A$262 million, and apply a deliberately conservative terminal P/E of 7x (compared with a trailing P/E of about 15x today and peer multiples of 17-40x trailing) for a terminal value of A$1,837 million. Total expected value of A$3,632 million implies an expected return of about 10.1% CAGR over two decades. The shares recently traded at a trailing P/E of 15x against a depressed FY25 earnings base; Kimi notes that low near-term earnings — with FY26 expected roughly flat to FY25 — are precisely what create the current opportunity as feasibility projects convert into EPCM delivery and SAXUM contributes to the Americas pipeline.

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Motilal Oswal: From Broker to Wealth and Asset Management Powerhouse

MOI Global Equity Research — Wed, 20 May 2026 20:03:26 GMT

Gokul Raj Ponnuraj of Bavaria Industries Group presented his in-depth investment thesis on Motilal Oswal Financial Services (India: MOTILALOFS) at Asian Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Motilal Oswal is an India-based, vertically integrated capital markets firm with a $4.5 billion market cap and franchises across asset management, wealth management, broking, investment banking, alternates, and financial distribution. Gokul Raj presented the company at the Asian Investing Summit 2026 as a way to participate in the financialization of Indian household savings. Insiders own more than 75% of the equity, and the business has compounded book value per share at 21%+ in USD terms (25%+ in INR) over the past decade, with revenues, AUM and profits all up roughly 10x over that period. The model is capital-light: the firm IPOed once, has not raised additional equity, has executed two buybacks, and has generated FCF since inception, which has been recycled into a treasury book that earns a low-20s IRR and provides funding advantages for the operating businesses.

The structural thesis rests on India’s underpenetrated equity culture and a rare cluster of growth drivers: 7%+ GDP growth, demographics, formalization, an under-levered household and corporate balance sheet, and a regulatory regime that has built a fully digital, transparent capital markets infrastructure. Gokul Raj estimates cumulative Indian gross savings of roughly $47 trillion over 15 years, with $3-4 trillion potentially flowing into capital markets at current allocation rates. Domestic investors now own ~85% of the market and SIP flows have been a relentless monthly bid, even as foreign investors have sold roughly $50 billion. Indian equities have underperformed EM by 25%+ over two years, the median stock is down 50% from its highs, and Motilal has corrected with the market – which Gokul Raj views as the entry point.

The mix shift in earnings is at the core of the re-rating case. Asset management has scaled 3x in five years, with mutual fund SIP AUM up ~6x and incremental flow market share of 8-10% versus a 3% stock share. Alternates – PE, real estate and a newly launched private credit fund – has delivered 20%+ IRRs across vintages, allowing each successive fund to be 2-3x the size of the prior one, with ~60% of carry accruing to shareholders given heavy insider ownership of the listed entity. Private wealth, entered in 2016, has grown net revenues and AUM 4-5x in five years, runs at 50%+ margins at scale, and benefits from RMs that are still on average only ~3 years vintage. The legacy broking franchise, now positioned as a full-service wealth distribution channel, has absorbed share losses to discount brokers by consolidating the tail and has built a high-rated lending book (margin trading and LAS) that has delivered near-zero credit costs across cycles.

Quality of earnings has shifted from broking-led to wealth- and asset-management-led, which now contribute over 50% of operating PAT and are tracking toward 70-80% within two to three years. Annual recurring revenue is ~60% of consolidated revenues; firms that have crossed the 65-70% ARR threshold (e.g., 360 ONE) trade at 30-40x PAT. Blended ROE will keep rising as the housing finance unit – the only capital-heavy and historically problematic operation, now cleaned up at <1% GNPA and 12-14% ROE – is monetized via IPO or sale within two to three years. Founders have pledged ~$500 million (10% of holdings) to education-related philanthropy over the next 5-10 years; the resulting promoter dilution would lift the regulatory cap on buybacks and likely accelerate repurchases when shares are cheap. Succession is in place, with both founders’ sons in operating roles and ~$300 million of equity held by non-family insiders.

The shares recently traded at less than 14x trailing operating profit after tax and 3x book value, with the treasury (~20% of firm value, ~70% public equity / 30% alternates) carried at what Gokul Raj considers a conservative 20% holdco discount. Stripping out MTM noise that has cluttered reported P&L over the past six months, Gokul Raj argues the operating business can compound earnings at 15-20% over the next decade, with optionality from margin expansion, ARR mix shift, buybacks, and a multiple re-rating toward the 30-40x PAT range that the market awards to pure wealth and asset management franchises. The downside is largely tied to a prolonged Indian equity drawdown – a scenario in which earnings might be hit by ~10% on a worst-case basis, while the high-beta franchise would offer leverage to any subsequent recovery.

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Motilal Oswal Presentation

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Twenty-Three Years After Buffett: Hoosik Min on Korea’s Second Act

MOI Global Equity Research — Wed, 20 May 2026 20:02:46 GMT

Hoosik Min of Pine Investment Advisory discussed the value and quality investment opportunity in Korea at Asian Investing Summit 2026. Hoosik also presented four case studies, including Seers Technology (Korea: 458870).

Session summary:

Hoosik Min expects improving ROE across Korean companies as industrial structure and capital-market reforms take hold. The KOSPI rose ~110% from early 2025 to March 2026 (2,400 to 5,052 points). Pine targets businesses with strong cash generation and reinvestment-led growth, run by managements with sound capital allocation, acquired at undervalued or fair prices. Roughly 20-30% of Korean listings recently traded below 1.0x PBR. KOSPI’s ten-year ROE has ranged 6-12%; Hoosik estimates that if ROE reaches 10-15% and OP margin expands to 14-16%, PBR could re-rate from 0.9-1.5x to 1.5-2.5x.

Korea carries real cost-of-equity risks: the North Korean border sits ~50 km from Seoul, chaebol governance opacity in a market just ~2% of global capitalization, and a super-aged demographic with a 0.8 fertility rate. Offsetting factors are accumulating: May 2024 Value-Up guidelines, a July 2025 amendment expanding directors’ duty of loyalty to shareholders, January 2026 treasury-stock disclosure tightening, and pending rules requiring cancellation of treasury stock within one year. Net cash is ~25% of KRX market cap; Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, and SK announced Q1 2026 buybacks of KRW 15.7, 13.5, and 5.0 trillion, respectively.

Pharma Research (214450), a medical-devices and cosmetics business, is anchored by the Rejuran brand (PN technology IP) in skin beauty. From 2020 to 2025, sales grew ~36% per year, net profit ~46%, and OP margin ran 30-40%; the stock rose 12x to KRW 403,000 at end-2025. After a recent correction, Hoosik views the shares as priced in a low range versus intrinsic value. Management emphasizes cash profits, has trimmed low-margin channels, and pursued small-scale M&A (Healer, Botox) for diversification. Risks include new entrants, compression of the 40% OP margin, and global-expansion costs.

Samyang Foods (003230), a Korean consumer-goods company, has ridden Buldak Ramen through five years of reinvestment-led growth. From 2021 to 2025, revenues grew ~29% per year, net profit ~42%, and OP margin expanded from 10% to 22%; the stock rose 13x to KRW 1,231,000 at end-2025. Exports moved from 10% of sales in 2015 to 80% in 2025. The Miryang factory (2020-2022) delivered operating leverage; a China facility starts in 2027. Global share is 3-4%. Risks include new competitors, trend durability, and a thin second growth engine.

Leeno Industrials (058470) supplies Pin & Socket components for semiconductor test equipment. Over 2011-2025, sales grew ~13% per year and net profit ~16%; the stock rose 35.8x over 15 years to KRW 60,500 at end-2025. By company estimate, Pin share runs 60-70% globally, with end clients including Apple, Qualcomm, TSMC, and Samsung Electronics. A new factory twice the size of the current one begins operations in 2026, extending capacity from customer-specific R&D to mass production. The principal risk is valuation.

Seers Technology (458870) is Hoosik’s newest case — an early-stage medical-equipment company focused on hospital operational efficiency. Consensus expects sales to grow ~78% per year and net profit ~99% over the next two years, with OP margin near 45% in 2026-2027E. Mobiecare (2020) is an AI arrhythmia diagnostic; ThynC (2024), ~90% of revenue, is a Bluetooth bedside monitoring gateway now expanding into the Middle East. Of Korea’s ~700,000 hospital beds, ~300,000 are addressable; ThynC sits near 10% penetration. Risks include low entry barriers, limited domestic TAM, and overseas software-security validation.

Hoosik frames the thesis as “South Korea Investment Season 2” — Season 1 being Warren Buffett’s 2002-2003 Korean purchases at 3-4x P/E after the IMF bailout. Season 2 centers on creative innovation and differentiated business. Capital-heavy industries are restructuring; shipbuilding, defense, and energy infrastructure have shifted from general-purpose to custom-order output, as HBM and server memory have in semiconductors. Korean brands are converting 20-30 years of cultural accumulation — PSY, BTS, Parasite, Squid Game, Han Kang’s 2024 Nobel — into price premium, with cosmetics exports compounding at a 16% CAGR. Hoosik likens the arc to Japan’s Value-Up program 14 years prior.

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Chagee: "Starbucks of Tea" with Global Ambitions at Single-Digit P/E Ex-Cash

MOI Global Equity Research — Fri, 15 May 2026 15:15:48 GMT

Roshan Padamadan of Luminance Capital presented his investment thesis on Chagee (Nasdaq: CHA) at Asian Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Chagee is a premium fresh-leaf tea platform based in China aiming to become the “Starbucks of tea” through global expansion. Founded in 2017 in Yunnan by Zhang Junjie — now China’s youngest billionaire, retaining ~35% ownership — Chagee operates 7,453 stores globally, with ~6,700 in Greater China, and brews via a proprietary “tea espresso” machine delivering ±2% consistency across geographies versus an estimated ±10% for barista-made products. Priced around 20 yuan (~$4-5) per drink, it targets the upwardly-mobile Chinese consumer and an under-branded global tea category with no dominant premium player.

The model is 82% franchised, with Chagee collecting royalties and supplying tea and ingredients at high margins, while its app (~177M registered users, ~45M active) drives ~90% of footfall. Store closure rates run at ~2%, well below the industry median, and franchise unit economics hold up even after monthly per-store revenues normalized from over RMB 500K to the RMB 350-400K range. Company-owned stores — 18% of revenue but +126% YoY in Q4 2025 — handle brand control in Singapore (~20 stores), the US (seven in LA), and Korea (new launch).

China is shifting from growth to cash generation, while international rollout — Korea, Malaysia (300-store franchise plan), Thailand JV, US, Middle East, and Europe — carries the valuation narrative. Same-store sales in China fell 20-24% in 2025 as Alibaba- and Meituan-led discount wars pulled coupon-seeking consumers toward mass-market peers HEYTEA and Mixue, but Chagee declined to participate, protecting brand equity. Chinese regulators have since pressured such discounting, which Roshan expects to improve sentiment during 2026.

FY2025 revenue was RMB 12.91B (~$1.85B), net income RMB 1.19B (~$170M), and non-GAAP net income RMB 1.91B (~$273M). The shares recently traded at ~$10 versus the April 2025 IPO at $28, implying a market cap of ~$1.7B, offset by a cash balance comprising a large share of that market cap, no debt, and ~$400M of annual FCF distributed as a dividend last December (~8-9% yield). Multiples are ~0.92x EV/Revenue, ~5.5x EV/EBITDA, and a single-digit P/E ex-cash. JPMorgan recently set a $16 target on stabilizing same-store sales in 2026, implying ~60% upside. Roshan views Chagee as a combination of value and growth with multi-bagger potential over 5-10 years, cushioned by cash and dividend yield.

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Sasken: From Project-Based Services to a Silicon Royalty Flywheel

MOI Global Equity Research — Fri, 08 May 2026 15:16:04 GMT

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Hitesh Kumar of Kosha Capital Advisors presented his investment thesis on Sasken Technologies (India: SASKEN) at Asian Investing Summit 2026.

Note by John: “This is an exceptionally well-articulated investment thesis by a highly knowledgable former employee of the subject company (Sasken). Even if you do not have access to the Indian equity markets, you may like to watch this presentation. It touches substantively on several US-listed companies, including Infosys and Qualcomm.”

Thesis summary:

Sasken is a ~$200 million market cap Indian embedded engineering firm with a 30-year heritage turning silicon into intelligent devices. Hitesh frames it as a company building a differentiated “Chip-to-Device” platform, spanning silicon design, embedded software, OS/platform, and device ODM, a combination no Indian ER&D peer matches. The business has absorbed multiple platform cycles (TI OMAP, Symbian, semiconductor consolidation) by investing in R&D and won a Rs 2.76 Bn IP arbitration in FY16. FY26E revenue of Rs 6,980 Mn (+27% YoY) brings organic scale back to the FY09 peak, now on a more diversified book.

The 60x4x3 strategy (grow 60 marquee accounts to $4M+ revenue each within three years) is reshaping the mix. Top 2 customer concentration has fallen from 50% in FY09 to 17% in FY25, while $4M+ accounts rose from 1 to 5. Headcount grew 54% between Q2 FY24 and Q3 FY26, temporarily compressing EBITDA margins from 27% to sub-5%; the latest quarters show recovery to 12–17% as utilization normalizes toward 80%.

Two acquisitions totaling ~Rs 400 Cr over 18 months completed the stack. Sasken Silicon (60% for Rs 33 Cr in FY24, led by ex-Qualcomm engineer Dr. Anup Savla) adds custom ASIC, RF/mmWave, and power-management IC capabilities with TSMC/GlobalFoundries/UMC foundry ties. BORQS Technologies ($40M, FY25) contributes end-to-end Android ODM, 130+ patents, and a 200+ member Qualcomm ODC. Combined with Sasken’s existing 100+ member Qualcomm ODC, the merged team engineers >85% of Qualcomm’s chipsets, positioning Sasken to ride Qualcomm’s $45 Bn SDV design-win pipeline, NTN satellite, IoT, and XR.

Corporate governance reads like a large-cap: 75% independent board, fully independent audit committee, zero audit qualifications across FY03–FY25, and a 20-year uninterrupted dividend with ~80% of the FY16 IP windfall returned to owners. Rs 300+ Cr of cash (~15% of market cap) provides downside protection.

The shares recently traded at ~30x FY26E P/E, a depressed-earnings year. On conservative FY28E assumptions ($150M revenue (only 11% CAGR versus recent 30–35% organic growth), services EBITDA at the low end of 14–17% management guidance, and no new ODM wins) EBIT could re-rate 3–4x and ROE (ex-cash) from 3% to ~24%. That implies ~12x FY28E P/E, ~7x EV/EBITDA, and 2.0x P/B versus peer medians of ~20x, ~13x, and 5.8x, a 40–65% discount for a business with visible order-book conversion, Qualcomm entrenchment, and tier-1 governance.

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Hikari Tsushin: Japanese Outlier With Two Decades of Strong Compounding

MOI Global Equity Research — Fri, 01 May 2026 20:01:24 GMT

Omar Malik of Hosking Partners presented his in-depth investment thesis on Hikari Tsushin (Japan: 9435) at Asian Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Hikari Tsushin is a Japanese holding company comprising three arms (a core distribution business, a listed equity portfolio, and opportunistic M&A), an outlier within corporate Japan. Founded by Yasumitsu Shigeta, who rebuilt the firm after a 99% drawdown in 2000, the group pivoted in 2010 toward in-house recurring-revenue products and a Berkshire-inspired capital-allocation framework. Over 15 years, Hikari has compounded operating profit above 20%, book value and dividends at 17% each, maintained ROE above 16%, and reduced share count by 18%.

The core business distributes essential services (electricity and gas, telecom lines, office water, and smartphone and home-appliance insurance) through roughly 1,000 agency partners housing 20,000 salespeople who sit on agency P&Ls rather than Hikari’s. Reach extends to 1.3 million corporate customers, or 20-30% of all Japanese corporates, and 4 million individuals; group churn runs under 2%. A low fixed-cost base allows Hikari to undercut incumbents and consolidate distressed peers, while a 200% five-year return hurdle on recurring revenue divided by CAC imposes discipline across channels. Outcomes include 30% share in office water, 80% in mobile device insurance, and the #2 position in independent electricity.

A culture of frugality, meritocracy, decentralized capital allocation, and mandatory after-tax share ownership underpins these advantages. President Wada, who joined out of university, has purchased roughly $100 million of stock personally. Between 2017 and recent years, management borrowed about $6 billion of long-dated Japanese debt near zero rates and deployed it into 500-600 undervalued Japanese equities plus an $800 million Berkshire Class A position (Hikari is the 10th-largest Class A holder). Portfolio cost of ~830 billion yen sits on a $4 billion gain, with an eight-year IRR of 18% versus 11% for TOPIX.

The shares recently traded at roughly 1.5x book, the low end of the range since 2022 despite 17% book CAGR, implying a core EV near 900 billion yen, or 8x reported operating profit and 5x on owner earnings. Management guides to 10% recurring operating-profit CAGR plus another 5% from M&A. On conservative assumptions of 10% core growth, a steady-state 10x terminal multiple, and a 50% portfolio uplift over five years, Omar estimates roughly 100,000 yen per share, implying 150% upside or a ~20% CAGR.

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Barratt Redrow: A “Stupidly Cheap” Stock Just Got 40% Cheaper

John Mihaljevic — Thu, 30 Apr 2026 18:29:45 GMT

One of my favorite sessions at European Investing Summit 2025 was Simon Caufield’s presentation on Barratt Redrow (UK: BTRW) on October 28. Simon argued that the UK’s largest homebuilder was “crazily undervalued,” trading at roughly 47% of his estimate of “liquidation value.” He titled the talk after Mark Twain’s line about the trouble being “what you know for sure that just ain’t so.” According to Simon, the misperception was not in the affordability statistics or the volume data the market was watching. It was in failing to understand how UK homebuilders behave during a downturn.

I left that session impressed and did not anticipate what would come next. In the six months since, Barratt Redrow shares have fallen close to another 40%, from roughly 400p at the time of Simon’s session to about 250p today. The market cap has compressed from £5.7 billion to about £3.6 billion. The shares are now trading at a 13-year low, and over the past three months Barratt Redrow has been the single worst performer on the entire FTSE 100.

An impression from one of the early Latticework summits

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When a stock that was already “stupidly cheap” gets cheaper by another ~40%, on a thesis that has, if anything, been confirmed by recent operating results, I find it worth revisiting. What follows is a refresher of Simon’s thesis for readers who did not see the original presentation, an update incorporating the financial results reported between late October 2025 and today, and an updated valuation exercise using his framework.

The Agentic Stub: Why Sabre Is One of the Most Asymmetric AI Setups

John Mihaljevic — Wed, 29 Apr 2026 18:28:24 GMT

This piece follows my recent article, “Who Gets Paid When AI Agents Subscribe to Data?”, in which I argued companies whose data is sensor-produced, regulator-cited, or embedded in a two-sided network stand to benefit from the growing adoption of agentic AI. I called out Amadeus (Spain: AMS) as “perhaps the best risk/reward large-cap on the list.”

Today I discuss Amadeus’s smaller and, in my view, more interesting comparable: Sabre Corporation (US: SABR). An important caveat up front: Sabre is highly leveraged relative to its equity cap, so if your investment process eschews debt-laden companies, this article will not appeal to you.

An impression from one of the early Latticework summits

Sabre is the world’s #2 global distribution system (GDS), a centralized network that facilitates automated, real-time transactions between travel service providers (airlines, hotels, car rental companies) and travel agencies. It sits on top of the same agentic data flywheel as Amadeus and, in several places, is further along on agentic infrastructure. The enterprise, however, trades at a fraction of Amadeus’s valuation, as Sabre carries roughly $4.2 billion of debt against a market cap under $750 million. This is a genuine equity stub, as defined in Chapter 10 of my book, The Manual of Ideas.

Equity stubs are uncomfortable, and the bear case for Sabre is zero. However, a combination of strong cash generation, deep proprietary data, aggressive deleveraging, and active engagement by 10+% shareholder Constellation Software (Canada: CSU) tilts the risk-reward in a way I find difficult to ignore. Buffett follower Discerene Capital, with close to 10% ownership, appears to hold a similar view.

Let’s understand why the uncomfortable optics of Sabre equity may be deceiving, and why investors may capture 3-7x upside as the company executes its agentic AI strategy and delevers.

Kitazato Corporation: Structural IVF Growth at Discount To Global Peers

MOI Global Equity Research — Mon, 27 Apr 2026 21:18:01 GMT

Patrick Rial of TriVista Capital presented his in-depth investment thesis on Kitazato Corporation (Japan: 368A) at Asian Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Kitazato is Japan’s leading provider of consumables for in vitro fertilization (IVF), generating over 60% of sales internationally and posting a 56% operating margin — the sixth-highest among non-financial Japanese listings. Patrick estimates the global fertility treatment market at roughly $49 billion, with 5-8% expected growth driven by later marriage, declining male sperm counts, rising egg-freezing adoption, expanding insurance coverage, and ongoing technological improvement. Kitazato’s sales have compounded at an 8.9% CAGR over the last decade.

The company’s moat stems from the vitrification revolution it pioneered with Japan’s Kato Ladies Clinic around 2000. Vitrification flash-freezes eggs in a glass-like state using liquid nitrogen, eliminating the ice-crystal damage of slow freezing and enabling near-100% thaw survival. Industry adoption from 2005 made it the global standard of care. Roughly 65% of Kitazato’s sales tie to vitrification, where it holds 60% share in Japan, 70% in Europe, 80% in China, and 85% in India. Across Japanese product categories, share ranges from 50% to 96%, including a near-monopoly in Cryotop storage devices.

Patrick views founder Futoshi Inoue, 55, as an exceptional operator aligned with shareholders. Inoue owns 58.9% of the company, describes shareholders as co-managers, and is unhappy with post-IPO share performance. FY results due in May should beat a -7.1% operating profit guide (Patrick models +4.5%); a dividend payout lift from the current 40% toward 50-70% is plausible given ¥12 billion of net cash and minimal capex; a potential cryobank business could open a new profit pool; and US growth should accelerate under new distribution partner DeviMed. Principal risks include competition, technological disruption, margin compression, and a possible further stake sale by Inoue.

The shares recently traded at 6.9x EV/EBIT, 13.3x P/E, 2.77x P/B, and a 3.0% dividend yield, with a ¥53 billion market cap. Public peers Cooper Companies and Vitrolife trade at 17.7-23.5x EV/EBIT and 24-38x P/E despite lower margins, while recent industry M&A has taken place at 5x+ sales, implying 18x+ EBITDA. Patrick’s DCF, assuming 4-8% sales growth and 57-59% operating margins, yields a ¥1,387-¥2,238 fair value range.

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Freee: Founder-Led Disruptor of Japan’s Accounting Incumbents

MOI Global Equity Research — Fri, 17 Apr 2026 20:01:17 GMT

Michael Fritzell of Asian Century Stocks presented his in-depth investment thesis on Freee (Japan: 4478) at Asian Investing Summit 2026.

Thesis summary:

Freee is a Japanese cloud-native software platform that functions as a back-office operating system for small and medium-sized enterprises, founded in 2013 by ex-Google executive Daisuke Sasaki and CTO Ryu Yokoji. Often described as the Japanese analogue of Australia’s Xero, Freee began as an accounting tool and has expanded into HR, payroll, tax filing, expense reimbursement, electronic signatures, invoicing, sales management, and a third-party app store with integrations including Rakuten, Amazon, and Line. The platform serves roughly 500,000 businesses and, together with Money Forward, holds about 15% of the Japanese accounting software market, with legacy desktop incumbents such as Yayoi lagging behind. Michael views Freee as the true disruptor because its automated bank and credit card linkages generate entries with minimal manual input, positioning it to take share as Japanese SMEs digitalize from a base of Excel and paper.

The core of Michael’s thesis is that the market has wrongly extrapolated generative-AI commoditization risk onto enterprise SaaS. Japanese software stocks are down sharply, and Freee itself has fallen roughly 30% YTD and about 50% from its 2025 peak, with some Japanese portfolio managers reportedly barred from touching the sector. Michael argues that enterprise systems of record are structurally different from point solutions: AI remains probabilistic and unsuitable for mission-critical accounting work, distribution and trust matter more than raw code, and Freee sits on proprietary transactional data from its half-million customers with more than 1,000 banking and financial integrations that are not replicable by vibe-coded alternatives. Monthly overall churn has declined to 1.1% in 2025 (corporate churn 0.5%, lower than Money Forward’s), and learning costs, limited data migration, and a growing app store bolster the moat.

The growth algorithm has compounded revenues at a 39% CAGR since 2019, driven by a 25% CAGR in paying customers (from 160,000 to about 607,000) and a 9% CAGR in ARPU (to roughly JPY 56,700). With Japanese cloud accounting penetration at only ~25-30%, Michael sees room for penetration to triple toward Australian and US levels, supporting sustained 30% top-line growth. Management has guided to 26% revenue growth in the current fiscal year and has historically beaten its targets, recently posting close to 30%. Share-count dilution is near zero, unlike typical US SaaS peers, so organic growth accrues cleanly to minorities.

Michael believes long-term operating margins can exceed 30% and potentially reach 40%, consistent with Xero at ~55% EBITDA margins in Australia/New Zealand, Fortnox at ~50% EBIT margins in Sweden, and Intuit’s SME segment at ~50%. ARPU of roughly $30-40 per month is low for the value delivered, and modest pricing uplift would convert the existing cost base into substantial leverage, analogous to Netflix’s pricing journey a decade ago. Catalysts include Money Forward’s September 2025 price hike (driving prospects to Freee), Freee’s December 2025 launch of consolidation accounting and manual double-entry bookkeeping (closing the feature gap), and accelerated AI product rollouts led by newly appointed Chief AI Officer Ryu Yokoji, including automated receipt capture, a ChatGPT tax guidance mini-app, an AI website builder, and a business-succession matching tool. Daisuke Sasaki, founder-CEO, is described as serious, non-promotional, and fully focused on building the business.

The shares recently traded at 2.3x EV/Sales, roughly half the multiple of industry peers and meaningfully below Money Forward. Freee is around GAAP breakeven with capitalized software costs, and Japanese retail investors appear to discount the delayed profitability inherent in the SaaS model. On Michael’s numbers, EV/Sales compresses to 2.0x in FY2027, then 1.7x, 1.4x, and 1.2x, with P/E falling below 10x by 2030 as margins scale into management’s long-term 30% operating margin guidance. Using conservative margin and exit-multiple assumptions, Michael arrives at an IRR of about 25%, with no dividend — the return is entirely a function of growth continuing from the guided 26% toward the high teens over several years. Some sell-side targets (Macquarie among them) sit at roughly double the recent share price, consistent with Michael’s view that the current multiple reflects near-term AI disruption fears rather than the underlying economics of a dominant, compounding Japanese SME platform.

Disclaimer

Asian Investing Summit 2026 was held from April 14-17, 2026. The content of this website is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security. The content is distributed for informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment advice or a recommendation to sell or buy any security or other investment, or undertake any investment strategy. There are no warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or results obtained from any information set forth on this website. BeyondProxy’s officers, directors, employees, and/or contributing authors may have positions in and may, from time to time, make purchases or sales of the securities or other investments discussed or evaluated herein.

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TBC Bank: A Mispriced Digital Growth Story in Central Asia

MOI Global Equity Research — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 20:33:39 GMT

Jean Pierre Verster of Protea Capital Management presented his investment thesis on TBC Bank Group (UK: TBCG) at Best Ideas 2026.

Thesis summary:

TBC Bank Group is a holding company operating two distinct banking entities in the Caucasus and Central Asia. TBC Bank Georgia, a universal bank, generates approximately 90% of group profits and holds a 40% market share in a stable duopolistic market. The remaining 10% of profits stem from TBC Uzbekistan, a high-growth digital venture mirroring the “super-app” strategy of fintech players like Kaspi. While the Georgian operation provides a foundation of stability, the expansion into Uzbekistan offers exposure to a market with ten times the population of Georgia and low banking penetration.

The Georgian operation anchors the thesis with consistent returns, having compounded earnings while maintaining long-term ROEs above 20%. Established in 1992, the bank has transitioned from a traditional physical network to a strong digital offering. Despite being situated in a region with perceived geopolitical friction—bordering Russia and occupied territories—the currency has remained relatively flat against the British Pound over the last decade, and the economy has benefited from recent migration inflows. The high level of dollarization in the Georgian economy is being actively managed through central bank “larization” initiatives to decrease foreign exchange risk.

Jean Pierre highlights Uzbekistan as the primary growth engine, leveraging a population of nearly 40 million to deploy a fintech-enabled strategy. Through acquisitions of payment provider Payme and e-classifieds platform OLX, TBC is building an ecosystem to capture a young, digitally savvy demographic. While this segment has delivered rapid loan growth, recent regulatory interventions aimed at curbing unsecured lending and a tick-up in NPLs suggest a near-term moderation in expansion rates. Consequently, the bank is pivoting toward secured and SME lending to de-risk the Uzbek book over the coming years.

Governance and capital allocation are anchored by a management team led by a CEO who has served since 1995. The group maintains a dividend payout ratio between 35% and 40%, supplementing shareholder returns with share buybacks when excess capital is available. Although the founder’s recent legal issues and subsequent pardon present a headline risk, the operational leadership has continued to deliver efficiency improvements, driving the cost-to-income ratio down to approximately 38%.

Regarding valuation, Jean Pierre argues the market misprices the gap between the company’s fundamental performance and its share price. The stock recently traded at a P/E of roughly 6x and a trailing tangible P/B of 1.3x, despite consistent ROEs exceeding 20% and healthy capital adequacy. Jean Pierre suggests a fair multiple would be closer to 2x tangible book value. A narrowing of this valuation gap, combined with earnings growth and a ~6% dividend yield, could support a 25% CAGR, potentially doubling the share price to around £80 by 2029.

Disclaimer

Best Ideas 2026 was held from January 6-23, 2026. The content of this website is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security. The content is distributed for informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment advice or a recommendation to sell or buy any security or other investment, or undertake any investment strategy. There are no warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or results obtained from any information set forth on this website. BeyondProxy’s officers, directors, employees, and/or contributing authors may have positions in and may, from time to time, make purchases or sales of the securities or other investments discussed or evaluated herein.

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Gimat: The Turkish “Costco” With a Decades-Long Growth Runway

MOI Global Equity Research — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 21:00:24 GMT

Monsoon Pabrai of Drew Investments presented her in-depth investment thesis on Gimat (Turkey: GMTAS) at Best Ideas 2026.

Thesis summary:

Gimat is an Ankara-based wholesaler-retailer operating a hybrid business model that combines a wholesale market, a modern consumer hypermarket, and a real estate-anchored ecosystem. Born from a cooperative of over 1,000 wholesalers in the early 1990s, Gimat functions similarly to a “Turkish Costco,” selling in bulk with low margins while owning its real estate assets. This structure provides a natural hedge against Turkey’s high inflation environment, protecting the company from rent escalation and supply chain disruptions. The company currently operates two locations, with the flagship store generating ~$1,200 in sales per square foot and gross margins exceeding 20%. The shareholder base remains unique, with 99% free float and thousands of small holders, largely descendants of the original cooperative members, ensuring a culture focused on continuity and working capital efficiency rather than aggressive corporate expansion.

The company’s expansion strategy is conservative and disciplined, aiming to open one new store roughly every two years. Each unit requires approximately 1 billion lira to build and reaches maturity within 18 to 24 months. The second location, opened recently, reached profitability faster than anticipated. Long-term goals include consolidating presence in Ankara before expanding to other major Turkish provinces and potentially Germany, leveraging the large Turkish diaspora. While the company does not currently charge a membership fee—a key differentiator from the Costco model—management is exploring options such as paid parking passes to introduce a membership-like revenue stream. The focus remains on sustainable growth that does not compromise their thin net margins, which historically sit near 1-2% but are bolstered by asset appreciation and high inventory turnover.

Management is led by General Manager Recai Kesimal, who holds proxies for over 25% of the wholesaler base. Kesimal’s approach is characterized by a “service” mindset, prioritizing the stability and longevity of the enterprise over short-term shareholder value creation. This alignment ensures operational discipline and aversion to excessive leverage or risky scaling. While the lack of large institutional investors and the fragmented ownership structure might typically raise governance concerns, the deep communal ties and the management’s track record of capital preservation mitigate these risks. The leadership is actively studying Costco’s operational and cultural efficiencies to further optimize their low-cost model.

Gimat recently traded at a market capitalization of approximately $156 million, which Monsoon argues is slightly below its estimated intrinsic value of $175 million. This intrinsic value calculation aggregates the earnings power of the two existing stores—generating roughly $11 million in PAT, valued at a conservative 10x multiple—and the real estate value of the “Gimat Arena” development. The latter includes projected office sales of $50 million and retained commercial property yielding $1 million in annual rent, capitalized at 6.5%. Despite trailing P/E ratios appearing inflated due to Turkish inflation accounting, the underlying asset base and cash flow generation present a “heads I win, tails I don’t lose too much” scenario, offering a free option on future growth for patient capital.

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Monsoon Pabrai on Gimat

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